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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When taxpayers underreport their federal income taxes, they are 
subject to a complex set of penalty regimes.1  The type of penalty that 
may be imposed depends on factors such as the taxpayer’s state of mind 
and efforts to correctly calculate its taxes, the type of issue that results in 
an underreporting, the type and level of authority supporting the 
taxpayer’s position, and whether the taxpayer disclosed the issue on its 
tax return.  However, there is a common exception for almost all the 
 
∗ © Partner, Clifford Chance US LLP, Adjunct Professor, New York Law School. 
 1. I.R.C. § 6663 (2006) (fraud); Id. § 6662(b)(1) (2006) (negligence or disregard of rules or 
regulations); Id. § 6662(b)(2) (substantial understatements of federal income tax); Id. § 6662(a) 
(understatements with respect to reportable transactions); Id. § 6662(b)(6) (understatements with 
respect to transactions lacking economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any 
similar rule of law). 
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penalty regimes where the taxpayer shows reasonable cause for its 
position, and that it acted in good faith in taking the position.2  In many 
cases, a taxpayer can establish reasonable cause and good faith by 
showing that the taxpayer reasonably relied in good faith on professional 
tax advice.3 
The penalty system serves a crucial role in fostering voluntary 
compliance with the tax law.4  However, Congress generally has rejected 
the automatic imposition of penalties for understatements of tax because 
of the complexity and uncertainty of many tax rules and principles.5  A 
 
 2. Id. § 6664(c)-(d) (2006).  The reasonable cause and good faith exception does not apply to 
understatements arising from transactions that lack economic substance or fail to meet the 
requirements of any similar rule of law.  Also, as discussed below, a modified version of the 
reasonable cause and good faith exception applies to understatements arising from so-called 
“reportable transactions.” 
 3. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6664-4(c), 1.6664-4(f)(2) (as amended in 2003).  Cf. I.R.C. § 
6664(d)(4)(B) (defining circumstances where advice may not be relied upon to establish the 
taxpayer’s reasonable belief about a position in a reportable transaction). 
 4. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW 
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO 
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) 31 (Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW 
PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS]: 
Penalties for the failure to comply with tax laws are a necessary component of any 
system of tax laws if broad compliance with the tax laws is to be expected.  Penalties for 
the failure to comply with laws serve to establish and validate the standards of behavior 
set forth by the tax laws themselves, as well as to punish specific departures from such 
laws.  Furthermore, the application of penalties in specific instances will help to promote 
the continued compliance with the tax laws by the currently law-abiding.  In the absence 
of penalties, the tax laws would, at best, represent a suggested code of behavior.  Anyone 
who disagreed with such code would be able to violate it without consequence.   
COMMISSIONER’S EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE ON CIVIL PENALTIES, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES II-2 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES]: 
Given the wide-ranging responsibilities of the IRS and the ultimate reliance of our 
taxation system on voluntary compliance, penalties have a relatively limited, though 
important role.  The compliance function of IRS is principally concerned with protecting 
and enhancing voluntarily compliant conduct by taxpayers.  Penalties constitute one 
important tool for IRS to use in pursuing its mission of encouraging voluntary 
compliance.  In line with IRS’s mission, IRS believes that penalties are positively related 
to the accomplishment of IRS’s mission only if they operate to encourage voluntary 
compliance, and that penalties can and should be evaluated solely on the basis of 
whether they do the best possible job of encouraging compliant conduct. 
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES:  
THE NEED FOR REFORM 2-3 (2009) [hereinafter AICPA REPORT]. 
 5. See generally GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY 
ACT OF 1982, at 216-17 (Comm. Print 1982) (“Congress recognized that taxpayers and the 
Government may reasonably differ over the sometimes complex Federal tax laws, and that a penalty 
is not appropriate in many cases in which there is a large underpayment because there was 
substantial authority for the taxpayer’s position”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 575 (1982) (Conf. 
Rep.): 
2
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regime that penalizes taxpayers that incorrectly claim benefits they 
legitimately believe are available risks creating the public perception 
that the tax law is arbitrary and unfair.6  Thus, the penalties for 
misreporting tax return information do not penalize the misreporting per 
se, but the taxpayer’s failure to adhere to a standard of behavior in 
determining and reporting its tax liability.7 
 
[t]he conferees did not adopt an absolute standard that a taxpayer may take a position on 
a return only if, in fact, the position reflects the correct treatment of the item because, in 
some circumstances, tax advisors may be unable to reach so definitive a conclusion.  
Rather, the conferees adopted a more flexible standard under which the courts may 
assure that taxpayers who take highly aggressive filing positions are penalized while 
those who endeavor in good faith to fairly self-assess are not penalized. 
Congress has imposed strict liability penalties for understatements arising from transactions lacking 
economic substance or failing to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law, and from 
“reportable transactions” that are not disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).  I.R.C. §§ 
6664(c)(6), (d)(2), (d)(3) (2006). 
 6. See REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at VIII-36: 
A strict liability penalty would be simple, easy to comprehend, and easy to administer.  
Because of the certainty of its application, such a penalty might be adequately severe 
even at lower rates.  On the other hand, the penalty would apply regardless of whether 
the taxpayer met the proposed standard of behavior.  Thus, the penalty would treat 
similarly situated taxpayers differently.  Given the complexity of the factual situations 
involved and the complexity of the tax law, the Task Force believes that the number of 
such penalties imposed on compliant taxpayers would be unacceptably high.  The Task 
Force was concerned that regularly penalizing taxpayers who comply with the standard 
would be considered unfair, would destroy the moral and ethical connotations of the 
penalty, and would ultimately undermine the standard of behavior.  Thus, the Task Force 
rejected a strict liability penalty. 
See also Clinton Stretch, Matthew Lay & John Galotto, Economic Substance and Strict Liability Do 
Not Mix, TAX NOTES 1357 (2009); AMERICAN BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, STATEMENT OF POLICY 
FAVORING REFORM OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX PENALTIES 9 (2009) [hereinafter ABA STATEMENT]; 
AICPA REPORT, supra, note 4, at 9-10. 
 7. See STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS, supra note 4, at 156:  
[t]he accuracy-related and return preparer penalties are designed to delineate (1) whether 
an erroneous position should be considered innocent and not subject to penalty, (2) when 
taxpayers should specifically notify the IRS that they are adopting controversial 
positions, and (3) when taxpayers are taking unduly aggressive positions and should be 
penalized for any resulting tax deficiency regardless of disclosure 
REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at II-4:  
Our general definition of a “penalty” as an adverse consequence imposed for violating a 
federal tax rule takes as a starting point a distinction between the consequence i.e., the 
penalty) imposed for violating a rule and the rule itself.  This distinction between a rule 
and the consequence of violating it establishes the fact that penalties operate in the 
service of a set of other rules or expectations.  The identification of the set of rules 
protected by penalties becomes, then, a critical issue, for each penalty should be 
evaluated based on its success in protecting or improving compliance with the rule to 
which it relates.  
See also REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at III-1-III-2 (penalties should set and 
validate standards of behavior, deter departures from those standards of behavior, and provide 
taxpayers who depart from those standards their just desserts). 
3
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The penalty standard of taxpayer behavior has evolved,8 but the 
modern penalty system generally has allowed a taxpayer to avoid 
penalties by establishing a bona fide belief that its position had a 
minimum likelihood of succeeding if challenged by the IRS and 
litigated.9  Because most taxpayers cannot independently determine the 
likelihood of success of a complex position, the current penalty system 
recognizes that a taxpayer often must rely on professional tax advice to 
determine its proper tax liability.10  However, the penalty system also 
recognizes that taxpayers should not be able to avoid penalties simply by 
obtaining favorable tax advice if that advice does not meet minimum 
standards of relevance and reliability, or if the taxpayer’s reliance is not 
reasonable and undertaken in good faith.11 
 
 8. See Peter A. Prescott, Taxpayer Civil Penalty Protection: Long Term Capital Holdings 
and its Wake, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 995, 1010-14, 1026-28 (2008); ABA STATEMENT, supra note 6, at 
2-4; REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at VIII-2-VIII-10. 
 9. I.R.C. § 6664(c)-(d) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as amended in 2003). 
 10. See REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES, supra note 4, at VIII-12 (“[t]he advisory and 
executory functions provided by practitioners is important to the preparation of returns in many 
situations and must be taken into account in identifying the appropriate standard.”). 
 11. A number of commentators have discussed the standards that opinions should meet to 
permit a taxpayer to avoid penalties.  See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 
46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111 (2009); Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s 
Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017 (2009); Henry P. Bubel, Avoiding Penalties with Tax 
Opinions After Long Term Capital, 817 PLI/TAX 785 (2008).  See generally Prescott, supra note 8.  
More generally, many viewpoints have been expressed about the responsibilities of tax advisors in 
providing penalty protection opinions.  See, e.g., BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & 
KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 101.2 (6th ed. 2006) (The “practitioner’s 
obligation to the client, however, is not unrestricted.  The practitioner also owes a duty, albeit less 
well-defined, to the tax system as a whole.”); Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return:  The 
Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583 (2006); 
Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1027 (1987); 
Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Formal Opinion 85-
352, 39 TAX LAW 643 (1986); Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer’s Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX 
REV. 681 (1997) (reviewing Bernard Wolfman, James P. Holden & Deborah H. Schenk, Ethical 
Problems in Federal Tax Practice (1995)); Myron C. Grauer, What’s Wrong with This Picture?:  
The Tension Between Analytical Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20 
CAP. U. L. REV. 353 (1991); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Reply, Counseling Ordered Liberty, 9 VA. 
TAX REV. 781 (1990); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. 
TAX REV. 77 (1989); James P. Holden, Practitioners’ Standard of Practice and the Taxpayer’s 
Reporting Position, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 327 (1991); James P. Holden, Commentary, Constraining 
Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 771 (1990); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided:  Duties 
to Clients and Duties to Others–the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the 
Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW 169 (2009); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging 
the Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693 (1997); Deborah 
H. Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1982) (reviewing Bernard Wolfman & James P. 
Holden, Ethical Problems in Federal Tax Practice (1981)); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax 
Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 468-76, 483-85 (2008); Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, 
Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 909 (1999). 
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In determining whether a taxpayer’s reliance on professional tax 
advice is reasonable and undertaken in good faith, courts have 
considered whether the tax professional has a conflict of interest.12  The 
focus on conflicts of interest is understandable—if the tax professional 
has a personal interest in whether the taxpayer claims a position, the tax 
advice may not reflect an objective assessment of the position’s merits.  
If the advice is not an objective assessment, but rather a self-interested 
assertion, there is little reason to permit the taxpayer to rely on the 
advice to avoid penalties, assuming that the taxpayer knew or should 
have known of the tax advisor’s own interest. 
In many of the relevant court cases, the tax professionals’ conflicts 
of interest were clear and egregious:  tax professionals who developed or 
marketed artificial tax shelters, prepared documents that created the 
illusion of legitimate business transactions, based their opinions on 
inaccurate factual assumptions, and were paid based on whether the 
taxpayer entered into the transaction, or claimed the alleged tax savings.  
However, in other cases, the factors suggesting a conflict of interest 
 
 12. Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’g 
82 Fed. Cl. 636, 714-15 (2008); Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 481-83 (7th Cir. 
2009); Mortensen v. Comm’r, 440 F.3d 375, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2006); Van Scoten v. Comm’r, 439 
F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2006); Chamberlain v. Comm’r, 66 F.3d 729, 732-33 (5th Cir. 1995); 
Goldman v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1994); Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 903 
(6th Cir. 1993); Iles v. Comm’r, 982 F.2d 163, 164-66 (6th Cir. 1992); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund 
v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 904-05 (E.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 568 F.3d 
537 (5th Cir. 2009); Maguire Partners-Master Invs., LLC v. United States, No. CV 06–07371–
JFW(RZx), 2009 WL 4907033 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009); Murfam Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v. 
United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247-48 (2010); Alpha I, L.P. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 280 
(2010); Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 56-57 (2007); 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 
T.C. 67 (2011); Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 193-95 (2009); Kerman v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1241 (2011); Palm 
Canyon X Inv., LLC v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009); Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. 
Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005); CMA Consol., Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-16.   
  See also Mark W. Everson, IRS Penalty Policy Statement, 2003 TNT 249-9 (Dec. 29, 
2003):  
[t]axpayers may not rely on the advice of a tax advisor who has a financial arrangement 
or a referral agreement with a tax shelter promoter.  The tax advisor’s independent 
judgment is compromised by these arrangements and agreements.  Accordingly, the 
Service will question the reasonableness and good faith of taxpayers who know or have 
reason to know that the tax advisor is not independent.  The Service will not accept 
reliance on an opinion from a non-independent tax advisor as proof of reasonable cause 
and good faith on the part of the taxpayer. 
In a number of other cases, courts have considered whether non-tax professionals have a conflict of 
interest precluding taxpayers’ reliance on their statements for purposes of a establishing reasonable 
cause and good faith defense to penalties.   
  See, e.g., Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(insurance agent); Anderson v. Comm’r, 62 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1995) (independent broker); 
Allison v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 568, 594, 598, 600 (2008) (investment advisor and accountant). 
5
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were more subtle:  the tax advisor developed or implemented the tax 
strategy; the tax strategy was separable from the underlying business 
transaction; the tax advisor influenced the facts on which his opinion 
was based; the tax advisor did not charge standard hourly rates, or 
agreed to receive a fee that was contingent on the completion of the 
transaction; or the tax advisor’s legal analysis contained omissions or 
errors. 
Most of the cases fail to articulate a test for determining whether a 
tax advisor has a disqualifying conflict of interest, other than stating 
generalities about a tax advisor developing, promoting, or implementing 
a tax shelter in which he has a financial interest.  In only one case has 
the court defined the circumstances when a tax advisor will be treated as 
a “promoter,” by postulating a contrasting paradigm of the disinterested 
and objective tax advisor.13  Under that paradigm, the tax advisor has a 
long term and continual relationship with the taxpayer, the advisor does 
not give unsolicited advice to the taxpayer, the advisor advises only 
within his field of expertise, the advisor follows his regular course of 
conduct in rendering the advice, the advisor charges only his regular 
hourly rate, and the advisor has no other stake in the transaction.14 
What the court decisions leave unclear is how to evaluate a 
taxpayer’s reliance on tax advice when features of the ideal paradigm are 
missing.  In practice, one frequently finds cases where a taxpayer 
engages a tax advisor for the first time to handle a transaction; where a 
tax advisor brings a transaction to his client or alerts the client of the 
need for tax advice; where a tax advisor takes a role in negotiating the 
commercial terms of a transaction on which he is providing tax advice; 
where a tax advisor makes relevant factual inquiries that are beyond the 
his specific area of expertise; and where a taxpayer and a tax advisor 
agree a fixed fee, or a fee that depends on whether the transaction 
completes. 
When one or more of the ideal features is missing, we need a 
framework for analyzing whether to deny the taxpayer the ability to rely 
on the tax advice to avoid penalties.  How to define that framework 
depends ultimately on the purpose of the reasonable cause and good 
faith standard.  If the purpose is to make predictions of the proper tax 
treatment more reliable, the framework should identify each factor that 
may induce an advisor to express overconfidence, and to balance the 
potential distortive effects against the cost to a taxpayer of obtaining 
 
 13. See 106 Ltd., 136 T.C. 67. 
 14. Id. at 80. 
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advice without that factor.  On the other hand, if the purpose of the 
reasonable cause and good faith standard is to avoid penalizing 
taxpayers who did not have reason to know that their tax return positions 
were incorrect, the framework should focus on whether a particular 
conflict has distorted the advice and whether the taxpayer should have 
known of the potential distortion.15 
The reasonable cause and good faith test contains elements of both 
purposes.  To be relied upon, an opinion must satisfy certain objective 
requirements that are likely to increase its predictive value:  the advice 
must be based on all pertinent facts and circumstances and the related 
law; it must take into account the taxpayer’s purposes and their relative 
weight; it must not be based on unreasonable assumptions or rely 
unreasonably on factual sources; it generally must be supported by 
certain types of legal authority and reach conclusions at a minimum 
level of confidence.  However, assuming those requirements are 
satisfied, the regulations do not require that an opinion be rendered 
under objectively perfect conditions.  Instead, the regulations focus on 
the taxpayer’s attempts to determine its proper tax liability. 
The taxpayer’s attempts to determine its proper tax liability must 
satisfy both an objective reasonableness standard and a subjective good 
faith standard.  Therefore, a court must consider both whether a 
reasonably prudent taxpayer would recognize the temptation for an 
advisor to give distorted advice, and whether the specific taxpayer 
intentionally overlooked the potential distortion.  Because it frequently is 
difficult to know exactly what a taxpayer or an advisor was thinking, the 
cases have tended to confuse the objective potential for distortion with 
the distortion itself and create per se rules that disqualify advice where 
the advisor has a conflict of interest. 
In creating a per se rule, a court effectively makes a subjective 
judgment about the level of temptation that a tax professional can resist.  
There are two problems with this approach.  First, what counts is not 
whether a hypothetical tax advisor could resist the temptation, but how 
the real, live tax advisor responded.  Even without perfect knowledge of 
the tax advisor’s subjective response, there usually is some evidence of 
the manner in which the tax advisor behaved, and that information will 
be more informative than a court’s speculations about a hypothetical 
advisor. 
 
 15. See Doran, supra note 11, at 122 (tax penalties serve the instrumental function of 
promoting tax compliance, and the function of defining tax compliance); Richard J. Wood, 
Accuracy-Related Penalties:  A Question of Values, 76 IOWA L. REV. 309, 320 (1991) 
(“noncompliant taxpayers should be subject to penalty only if it would enhance compliance.”). 
7
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Second, and more importantly, the focus of the reasonable cause 
and good faith exception is not on the behavior of the tax advisor but 
rather on that of the taxpayer.  The most important factor is whether, 
under all the pertinent facts and circumstances, the taxpayer has made a 
reasonable effort to assess its proper tax liability.16  Therefore, the 
proper analysis should be the extent to which the taxpayer is aware of a 
potential temptation for the tax advisor to distort his advice, and the 
extent to which the circumstances indicate that the advisor has resisted 
those potential temptations. 
This article has five parts.  The second part describes the statutory 
and regulatory standards for taxpayers seeking to rely on tax advice to 
avoid penalties.  The third part describes the cases where a taxpayer has 
sought to rely on the opinion of a tax advisor with a conflict of interest.  
Those cases involve three types of situations:  (1) tax advisors acting as 
promoters or brokers of a tax shelter; (2) tax advisors with referral 
arrangements with tax shelter promoters; and (3) tax advisors that are 
developers or implementers of a tax strategy.  Typically, in the first two 
types of situations, it is easy to conclude that the taxpayer should have 
known of the temptation for the tax advisor to provide distorted advice 
and to determine that the advisor did not sufficiently resist such 
temptation.  However, in the third type of situation, the temptations 
facing a tax advisor often are much more subtle, and it often is difficult 
to isolate those temptations from many typical conditions facing a tax 
advisor with a transactional practice.  It likewise is difficult for a 
taxpayer receiving advice in a transactional context to evaluate how the 
advisor has responded to any temptation. 
The fourth part of this article proposes a framework for analyzing 
how a conflict of interest may affect the reliability of a tax advisor’s 
opinion.  It first argues that the analysis should not apply a per se rule, 
but rather should determine reasonableness and good faith from the 
perspective of what the taxpayer knew or should have known of the tax 
advisor’s conflict and how the conflict may have affected the reliability 
of the opinion.  In the absence of a per se rule, a court first should 
consider whether a conflict is relevant to the reliability of the opinion.  If 
the conflict is relevant, the court should consider both (1) the 
inducement that the apparent conflict may have created to distort the 
advice (“temptation”), and (2) the advisor’s apparent response to such 
inducement (“resistance”).  These two variables can be used to create a 
framework where the level of apparent temptation is compared to the 
 
 16. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
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level of apparent resistance.  Thus, for example, a court should be more 
vigilant in a case involving a high level of apparent temptation and a low 
level of apparent resistance, than in a case involving a low level of 
apparent temptation and a high level of apparent resistance.  Finally, the 
article explores common forms of temptation that tax advisors face when 
advising on tax-motivated transactions, and considers the circumstances 
when an advisor’s response to those temptations can make an opinion 
unreliable. 
II.  STANDARDS FOR RELYING ON TAX ADVICE TO AVOID PENALTIES 
Section 6664(c) of the Code and the associated Treasury 
Regulations provides an exception to the penalties for fraud, negligence, 
or disregard of rules or regulations, and substantial understatements of 
federal income tax where the taxpayer shows that it had reasonable 
cause for the position, and acted in good faith with respect to the 
position.17  Treasury Regulation Section 1.6664-4(b)(1) states that:  
the determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause 
and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 
all pertinent facts and circumstances.  Generally, the most important 
factor is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort to assess the taxpayer’s 
proper tax liability.  Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause 
and good faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that 
is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including 
the experience, knowledge and education of the taxpayer. . . .   
Reliance on professional tax advice constitutes reasonable cause and 
good faith only if, under all the circumstances, such reliance was 
reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith.18   
All facts and circumstances must be taken into account in 
determining whether a taxpayer has reasonably relied in good faith on 
such advice.19 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6664-4(c)(1) states that a taxpayer 
will not be considered to have reasonably relied on tax advice unless the 
advice satisfies various requirements.20  First,  
the advice must be based upon all pertinent facts and circumstances 
and the law as it relates to those facts and circumstances.  For example, 
 
 17. Id. § 6664 (c). 
 18. Id. §1.6664-4(b). 
 19. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).  For example, the taxpayer’s education, sophistication, and business 
experience will be relevant. 
 20. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).  
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the advice must take into account the taxpayer’s purposes (and the 
relative weight of such purposes) for entering into a transaction and for 
structuring a transaction in a particular manner.  In addition, [the 
advice] will not qualify if the taxpayer fails to disclose a fact that it 
knew, or reasonably should have known, was to the proper tax 
treatment of the transaction.21 
Second, 
the advice must not be based on unreasonable factual or legal 
assumptions (including assumptions as to future events) and must not 
unreasonably rely on the representations, statements, findings, or 
agreements of the taxpayer or any other person.  For example, the 
advice must not be based upon a representation or assumption which 
the taxpayer knew, or had reason to know, was unlikely to be true, 
such as an inaccurate representation or assumption as to the taxpayer’s 
purposes for entering into a transaction or for structuring a transaction 
in a particular manner.22 
Third, “a taxpayer may not rely on an opinion or advice that a 
regulation is invalid unless the taxpayer adequately disclosed the 
position that the regulation in question is invalid.”23  If the 
underpayment is attributable to a reportable transaction, failure by the 
taxpayer to properly disclose the transaction is a strong indication that 
the taxpayer did not act in good faith.24 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6664-4(f) contains special rules for 
purposes of applying the reasonable cause and good faith exception to 
tax shelter items of corporations.25  A corporation’s legal justification 
may be taken into account only if (1) there is substantial authority for the 
tax treatment of the item, and (2) based on all facts and circumstances, 
the corporation reasonably believed, at the time the tax return was filed, 
that the tax treatment of the item was more likely than not the proper 
treatment.26  The reasonable belief requirement will be considered 
satisfied if either: 
• The corporation analyzed the pertinent facts and authorities in the 
manner described in Treasury Regulation Section 1.6662-
 
 21. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i). 
 22. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2003). 
 23. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(iii).  
 24. Id. § 1.6664-4(d). 
 25. Id. § 1.6664-4(f).  In the case of reportable transactions subject to the penalty in I.R.C. § 
6662A, the rules in Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f) are effectively superseded by the rules contained in 
I.R.C. § 6664(d), discussed below. 
 26. Id. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(B). 
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4(d)(3)(ii) (relating to the substantial authority test), and in 
reliance upon that analysis, reasonably concluded in good faith 
that there was a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax 
treatment of the item would be upheld if challenged by the IRS; 
or 
• The corporation reasonably relied in good faith on the opinion of 
a professional tax advisor that meets the requirements of 
Treasury Regulation Section 1.6664-4(c), described above, the 
opinion is based on the tax advisor’s analysis of the pertinent 
facts and authorities in the manner described in Treasury 
Regulation Section 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (relating to the substantial 
authority test), and the opinion unambiguously states the tax 
advisor’s conclusion that there is a greater than 50% likelihood 
that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by 
the IRS.27 
The analysis must not take into account the possibility that a tax 
return will not be audited, that an issue will not be raised on audit, or 
that an issue will be settled.28   
Although satisfaction of the foregoing requirements 
is an important factor to be considered in determining whether a 
corporate taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith, it is 
not necessarily dispositive.  For example, depending on the 
circumstances, satisfaction of the minimum requirements may not be 
dispositive if the taxpayer’s participation in the tax shelter lacked 
significant business purpose, if the taxpayer claimed tax benefits that 
are unreasonable in comparison to the taxpayer’s investment in the tax 
shelter, or if the taxpayer agreed with the organizer or promoter of the 
tax shelter that the taxpayer would protect the confidentiality of the tax 
aspects of the structure of the tax shelter.29 
Section 6664(d) of the Code provides special rules for applying the 
reasonable cause and good faith exception to the penalty under Section 
6662A of the Code for understatements arising from “reportable 
transactions,” which include “listed transactions” and other transactions 
having certain characteristics that are commonly found in abusive tax 
shelters.30  The exception will not apply unless (A) the position is 
adequately disclosed (or the penalty for non-disclosure was rescinded), 
 
 27. Id. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(b)(1)-(2). 
 28. Id. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(b) (as amended in 2003). 
 29. Id. § 1.6664-4(f)(3). 
 30. See I.R.C. § 6664(d) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2003). 
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(B) there is or was substantial authority for the position, and (C) the 
taxpayer reasonably believed that such treatment was more likely than 
not the proper treatment.31  A taxpayer will be treated as having a 
reasonable belief with respect to the tax treatment of a position only if 
such belief (i) is based on the facts and law that exist at the time the 
relevant return is filed, and (ii) relates solely to the taxpayer’s chances of 
success on the merits of such treatment and does not take into account 
the possibility that a return will not be audited, such treatment will not 
be raised on audit, or such treatment will be resolved through settlement 
if it is raised.32 
In addition, under section 6664(d)(4)(B) of the Code, an opinion of 
a tax advisor may not be relied upon to establish the reasonable belief of 
a taxpayer if the tax advisor is a “disqualified tax advisor,” or the 
opinion is a “disqualified opinion.”33  A tax advisor is disqualified if the 
tax advisor: 
(I) is a material advisor”34 . . . and participates in the organization, 
management, promotion or sale of the transaction or is related to any 
 
 31. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3). 
 32. Id. § 6664(d)(4). 
 33. Id. § 6664(d)(4)(B).   
 34. A material advisor is a person who provides material aid, assistance, or advice with 
respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing, insuring, or carrying out any 
reportable transaction, and who directly or indirectly derives gross income in excess of a threshold 
amount for such aid, assistance or advice.  Id. § 6111(b)(1). 
  Notice 2005-12, 2005-7 I.R.B. 494, clarifies when a material advisor will be treated as 
participating in the organization, management, promotion, or sale of the transaction.  A material 
advisor participates in the organization of a transaction if the advisor (1) devises, creates, 
investigates, or initiates the transaction or tax strategy, (2) devises the business or financial plans for 
the transaction or tax strategy, (3) carries out those plans through negotiations or transactions with 
others, or (4) performs acts relating to the development or establishment of the transaction, 
including preparing documents that (A) establish the structure used in connection with the 
transaction, (B) describe the transaction for use in the promotion or sale of the transaction, or (C) 
register the transaction with any federal, state, or local government body.  A material advisor 
participates in the management of a transaction if the material advisor is involved in the decision-
making process regarding any business activity with respect to the transaction.  Participation in the 
management of the transaction includes managing assets, directing business activity, or acting as 
general partner, trustee, director, or officer of an entity involved in the transaction.  A material 
advisor participates in the promotion or sale of a transaction if the material advisor is involved in the 
marketing of the transaction or tax strategy.  Marketing activities include (1) soliciting, directly or 
through an agent, taxpayers to enter into a transaction or tax strategy, (2) placing an advertisement 
for the transaction, or (3) instructing or advising others with respect to marketing of the transaction 
or tax strategy.  A tax advisor, including a material advisor, will not be treated as participating in the 
organization, management, promotion, or sale of a transaction if the tax advisor’s only involvement 
is rendering an opinion regarding the tax consequences of the transaction.  In the course of 
preparing a tax opinion, a tax advisor is permitted to suggest modifications to the transaction, but 
the tax advisor may not suggest material modifications to the transaction that assist the taxpayer in 
12
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person who so participates, (II) is compensated directly or indirectly by 
a material advisor for the transaction, (III) has a fee arrangement with 
respect to the transaction which is contingent on all or part of the 
intended tax benefits of the transaction being sustained, or (IV) as 
determined under regulations, has a disqualifying financial interest 
with respect to the transaction.35 
An opinion is disqualified if the opinion (I) is based on 
unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to 
future events), (II) unreasonably relies on representations, statements, 
findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person, (III) does 
not identify and consider all relevant facts, or (IV) fails to meet any 
other requirement as the IRS may prescribe.36 
Section 10.35 of Treasury Department Circular 230 sets forth 
standards that a tax advisor must apply in providing certain tax 
opinions.37  These standards apply to tax advisor opinions addressing tax 
issues arising from listed transactions, transactions having tax avoidance 
as their principal purpose, and transactions with a significant tax-
avoidance purpose, provided the opinion meets certain qualifications.38  
These qualifications are:  (1) the opinion reaches a level of confidence 
that permits the taxpayer to rely on the opinion to avoid penalties,39 (2) 
 
obtaining the anticipated tax benefits.  Merely performing support services or ministerial functions 
such as typing, photocopying, or printing will not be considered participation in the organization, 
management, promotion, or sale of a transaction. 
 35. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(ii); see also Notice 2005-12.  Notice 2005-12 states that a tax 
advisor will be treated as a disqualified tax advisor, even if not a material advisor, if the tax advisor 
has a referral fee or a fee-sharing arrangement by which the advisor is compensated directly or 
indirectly by a material advisor.  In addition, an arrangement will be treated as a disqualified 
compensation arrangement if there is an agreement or understanding with a material advisor 
pursuant to which the tax advisor is expected to render a favorable opinion regarding the tax 
treatment of the transaction to any person referred by the material advisor.  A tax advisor will not be 
treated as having a disqualified compensation arrangement if a material advisor merely recommends 
the tax advisor who does not have an agreement or understanding with the material advisor to 
render a favorable opinion regarding the tax treatment of the transaction. 
 36. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B)(iii). 
 37. Circular 230 contains the rules governing practice before the IRS and is codified at 31 
C.F.R. Subtitle A, Part 10. 
 38. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B) (2011). 
 39. Id. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(1), (b)(4) (2011).  Specifically, the standards apply if the opinion 
concludes that there is a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax treatment of an item will be upheld 
if challenged by the IRS and does not include a prominent statement that the opinion may not be 
used by the taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding penalties.  Id.  The presence of such a statement  
does not in itself  prevent a taxpayer from relying on the opinion to avoid penalties.  See also David 
T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment Limitations 
on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 858 (2006). 
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the opinion will be used to market the transaction,40 (3) the tax advisor 
requires the taxpayer to maintain the confidentiality of the advisor’s tax 
strategies,41 or (4) the advisor’s fees are conditioned on the taxpayer 
obtaining the intended tax benefits.42  The standards include a 
requirement that the opinion prominently disclose any compensation 
arrangement or referral agreement that the tax advisor (or his firm) has 
with a third party with respect to the promotion, marketing, or 
recommendation of the relevant transaction,43 and in the case of an 
opinion used to market a transaction, that the opinion was written to 
support the promotion or marketing of the transaction.44 
III.  JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
The regulations under the general reasonable cause and good faith 
exception do not explicitly preclude a taxpayer from relying on advice 
from an advisor having a conflict of interest.45  However, the courts 
have developed the principle that a taxpayer’s reliance on advice will not 
be considered reasonable and undertaken in good faith where the 
taxpayer knew or should have known that the advisor had a significant 
conflict of interest. 
In a number of cases, the tax advisor’s conflict of interest is 
obvious.  Those cases generally involve situations where the 
 
 40. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(2), (b)(5).  Specifically, the standards apply if the tax 
advisor knows or has reason to know that the opinion will be used or referred to by a third party in 
promoting, marketing, or recommending the relevant transaction, and the opinion does not include 
prominent statements that the opinion may not be used by the taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding 
penalties, the opinion was written to support the promotion or marketing of the transaction, and the 
taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances from an independent 
tax advisor.   
 41. Id. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(3), (b)(6).  Specifically, the standards apply if the tax advisor 
imposes a limitation on disclosure of the tax treatment or tax structure of the transaction and the 
limitation on disclosure protects the confidentiality of the advisor’s tax strategies, regardless of 
whether the limitation on disclosure is legally binding.  A claim that a transaction is proprietary or 
exclusive is not a limitation on disclosure if the advisor confirms to all recipients of the opinion that 
there is no limitation on disclosure of the tax treatment or tax structure of the relevant transaction.   
 42. Id. §§ 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C)(7), (b)(7).  Specifically, the standards apply if the taxpayer has the 
right to a full or partial refund of fees if all or a part of the intended tax consequences from the 
matters addressed in the opinion are not sustained, or if the fees are contingent on the taxpayer’s 
realization of tax benefits from the transaction.    
 43. Id. § 10.35(e)(1). 
 44. Id. § 10.35(e)(2).  The legend for an opinion used to market a transaction also must 
disclose that the taxpayer should seek advice based on the taxpayer’s particular circumstances from 
an independent tax advisor. 
 45. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(4)(B) (2006).  As discussed above, under Code § 6664(d)(4)(B), a 
taxpayer may not rely on the opinion of a “disqualified tax advisor” to establish a reasonable cause 
and good faith defense to the penalty for reportable transaction understatements. 
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professional tax advisor was a promoter of a tax shelter,46 a broker,47 or 
had a referral arrangement with a promoter.48  In many of those cases, 
the advisor also developed or implemented the tax shelter.  In other 
cases, the conflicts of interest are less apparent.  Those cases generally 
involve tax advisors that were developers or implementers of a tax 
strategy, but had not engaged in marketing activity and had no 
relationship with a tax shelter promoter.49  As discussed below, many of 
the cases where a tax advisor was a promoter or broker, or had a referral 
arrangement with a promoter, are interesting for their facts, which 
illustrate tax advisors confronting the tension between their roles as 
advisors and their roles as promoters or brokers.  However, with one 
exception, those cases fail to articulate a test for determining whether a 
tax advisor has a disqualifying conflict of interest, other than stating 
generalities about a tax advisor developing, promoting, or implementing 
a tax shelter in which he has a financial interest.  The cases where a tax 
advisor is merely the developer or implementer of a tax strategy are 
interesting because of the courts’ attempts to identify and analyze more 
subtle conflicts of interest. 
A. Tax Advisors as Promoters or Brokers 
The most obvious conflict of interest is where a tax advisor also is 
the promoter of a tax shelter, or acts essentially as a broker, and is 
compensated as such by the tax shelter promoter.  In those cases, the tax 
advisor has a direct financial interest in the tax savings being promoted, 
frequently through compensation based on the amount of the purported 
 
 46. See Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Mortensen v. Comm’r, 440 F.3d 375, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2006); Van Scoten v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 
1243, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2006); Pasternak v. Comm’r, 990 F.2d 893, 903 (6th Cir. 1993); Iles v. 
Comm’r, 982 F.2d 163, 164-66 (6th Cir. 1992); Maguire Partners-Master Invs., LLC v. United 
States, No. CV 06–07371–JFW(RZx), 2009 WL 4907033 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009); Murfam 
Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247-48 (2010); Jade Trading, LLC v. 
United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 56-57 (2007); 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67, 79 (2011); New 
Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 193-95 (2009); Kerman v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1241 (2011); Palm Canyon X Inv., LLC v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009).  
 47. Stobie Creek, 608 F.3d at 1381-83; Goldman v. Comm’r, 39 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (insurance agent). 
 48. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 904-05 (E.D. Tex. 
3007) ), aff’d on other grounds, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Alpha I, L.P. v. United States, 93 
Fed. Cl. 280 (2010). 
 49. Am. Boat Co., LLC v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 481-83 (7th Cir. 2009); Canal Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199 (2010). 
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tax savings.50  Because the tax advisor has a personal interest in the 
purported tax savings, a taxpayer reasonably should discount the advice 
when seeking to determine its proper tax liability.51 
For example, in Stobie Creek, the court held that the taxpayers 
could not rely on the advice of two law firms because they knew or 
should have known that both law firms participated in the promotion and 
implementation of a tax shelter, and received fees based on the amount 
of purported tax savings.52  In reaching its conclusion, the court stated 
the principle that “[a]dvice hardly qualifies as disinterested or objective 
if it comes from parties who actively promote or implement the 
transaction in question.”53 
The taxpayers in Stobie Creek, all members of a family, agreed to 
sell a 50% interest in the family business.54  They turned to the 
relationship partner of the law firm (“SLK”) that had regularly advised 
the family and the business, to negotiate and document the sale.55  
Because the transaction would be taxable, the family asked if SLK was 
familiar with any strategies that could reduce the taxes.56  SLK 
previously had assisted other clients in connection with a tax shelter 
promoted by another law firm (“J&G”).57  An SLK tax lawyer contacted 
a J&G tax partner, arranged for confidentiality agreements to be 
prepared and signed by family members, and proposed a fee 
arrangement, based on the amount of tax savings, to be shared by SLK 
and J&G.58 
 
 50. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(4) (as amended in 2003).  If the advisor’s fees are conditioned 
on the taxpayer deriving the intended tax benefits, or are refundable to the taxpayer if such benefits 
are denied, the transaction generally will be a reportable transaction.  In that case, the more stringent 
rules of I.R.C. § 6664(d) will prevent the taxpayer from relying on the advisor’s opinion to establish 
reasonable cause and good faith.  Also, the opinion will be subject to the standards of Circular 230 § 
10.35 discussed above. 
 51. If the tax advisor complies with Circular 230, the taxpayer will have been informed in the 
opinion of any compensation arrangement that the advisor has with a third party promoter or broker, 
and whether the opinion was prepared to support the marketing of the transaction by a third party 
promoter or broker. 
 52. Stobie Creek, 608 F.3d at 1382-83.  The court also concluded that the taxpayers could not 
rely on the opinion because they should have recognized that the purported tax benefits were “too 
good to be true.”  Id. at 1383. 
 53. Id. at 1382. 
 54. Id. at 1369-70. 
 55. Id. at 1369. 
 56. Id. at 1370. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1371. 
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At a family meeting, the SLK relationship partner made a 
presentation on the proposed tax shelter.59  When asked whether he 
would engage in the strategy if he were in the family’s position, he 
confirmed that he would, and the family agreed to pursue the strategy 
with SLK’s assistance.60  The relationship partner later sent a sample 
opinion that would be rendered by J&G.61  In a cover letter, he noted 
that the IRS was attacking tax shelters generally, but distinguished the 
tax shelter being proposed by SLK and J&G.62  He nevertheless 
discussed the possibility of penalties being imposed if the transaction 
were disallowed.63  He noted that J&G had offered to SLK a portion of 
J&G’s fee, and stated that SLK was “not recommending” that the family 
pursue the strategy.64  He explained that SLK was prohibited under a 
confidentiality agreement with J&G from rendering an opinion on the 
tax shelter, and therefore SLK had no occasion to determine whether it 
would be prepared to issue such an opinion.65  Finally, the relationship 
partner pointed out that the opinion would be based on representations 
from the family, notably about its profit motive and non-tax business 
reasons for entering into the tax shelter.66 
SLK and J&G prepared the tax shelter documentation, which 
included certain undated or backdated documents, and draft tax 
returns.67  Following the closing, the SLK relationship partner reminded 
the family of the fee arrangement, but expressed willingness either to 
waive a portion of the fee or to make a charitable contribution.68  He 
also indicated that if the family decided not to claim the purported tax 
benefits, SLK would not charge its fee.69  Ultimately, SLK received the 
entire fee but made a charitable contribution of a small fraction of the 
fee.70 
Before tax returns were filed, the IRS issued a notice describing 
and rebutting certain similar tax shelters, and qualifying them as “listed 
transactions.”71  SLK tax lawyers prepared an internal memorandum that 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 1371, 1373. 
 68. Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 651-52 (Ct. Cl. 2008). 
 69. Id. at 652. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 653. 
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attempted to distinguish the tax shelter entered into by the family from 
the transactions described in the IRS notice.72  The relationship partner 
hand wrote on the memorandum the comments, “B.S.,” “we don't 
qualify,” “looks like us,” and “I wouldn’t count on this.”73  The 
relationship partner called the family to alert them about the notice, 
shared his concerns, and related his tax colleagues’ analysis.74  He 
recommended that a conference call be scheduled with J&G, to have that 
firm’s view.75  In that call, the J&G tax partner stated that J&G’s 
opinion committee had reviewed the notice and determined that it did 
not affect transactions of the type entered into by the family, and that 
J&G would provide an opinion to that effect.76  She gave three reasons 
for the conclusion that the notice was inapplicable, and said that other 
taxpayers were continuing to pursue transactions of that type.77  The 
SLK relationship partner stated at the end of the call that he had heard 
enough and was satisfied with J&G’s opinion.78 
An SLK tax lawyer sent to the family a draft of the J&G tax 
opinion, and a family member discussed with him the various 
representations from the family that were included in the draft opinion, 
notably about the family’s profit motive and non-tax business reasons 
for entering into the tax shelter.79  The draft opinion also contained a 
statement that J&G had been informed that an objective investment 
analysis indicated a substantial probability that the transactions would 
generate a profit before taxes.80  SLK tax lawyers considered that 
statement, assumed that J&G had received such an analysis from 
someone else, and made no further inquiries.81 
In New Phoenix Sunrise, the court held under a similar set of facts 
to those in Stobie Creek that the taxpayers could not rely on a tax 
opinion of a law firm that actively participated in the development, 
structuring, promotion, sale, and implementation of a tax shelter, in 
circumstances where the taxpayers’ independent lawyers expressed 
concerns about that the tax shelter, and the taxpayers should have known 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 653-54. 
 74. Id. at 654.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 654-55. 
 78. Id. at 655. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
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that the law firm had a personal stake in the tax shelter.82  In reaching its 
conclusion, the court stated its conclusions as follows: 
We find petitioner’s reliance on Jenkens & Gilchrist and the tax 
opinion to be unreasonable rather than reasonable.  Jenkens & Gilchrist 
actively participated in the development, structuring, promotion, sale, 
and implementation of the BLISS transaction. Petitioner was not 
reasonable in relying on the tax opinion in the face of such a conflict of 
interest.83 
The taxpayers in New Phoenix Sunrise were members of a family 
that sold a family-owned business at a substantial gain.84  A partner in 
the law firm (“B&E”) that was handling the sale introduced the family to 
the same J&G law firm that appeared in Stobie Creek, and provided 
information to J&G to assist in preparing a proposal for a tax shelter.85  
J&G prepared documents for the tax shelter transaction, many of which 
were undated or backdated.86  After the tax shelter transaction closed, 
the B&E partner communicated to J&G that he felt incapable of advising 
the accountants regarding the proper reporting of the transaction.87  The 
B&E partner also forwarded to a family member a news article about 
IRS actions to challenge abusive tax shelters.88  The B&E partner 
advised the family member that in view of the news article and possible 
IRS action, it was important to prepare and file the tax returns as soon as 
possible.89  Subsequently, the Treasury Department issued regulations 
requiring the disclosure of certain tax shelters.90  The B&E partner 
discussed those regulations with J&G, which indicated that the new 
regulations applied to the tax shelter “and that not disclosing it was an 
aggressive position to take.”91  J&G nevertheless issued a favorable tax 
opinion regarding the shelter.92  The B&E partner discussed the new 
regulations with the family member and informed him “that not 
disclosing the transaction was an aggressive position requiring approval 
 
 82. New Phoenix Sunrise v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 193-95 (2009).  The court also concluded 
that the taxpayers could not rely on the opinion because they should have recognized that the 
purported tax benefits were “too good to be true.”  Id. at 195. 
 83. Id. at 193. 
 84. Id. at 164. 
 85. Id. at 164-65. 
 86. Id. at 165. 
 87. Id. at 170. 
 88. Id. at 171. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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of the tax return preparer.”93  The family member later responded that he 
intended to take “as aggressive a position as possible in filing the tax 
return.”94  The B&E partner subsequently discussed with J&G the 
possibility that the transaction was “substantially similar” to certain 
listed transactions described in an IRS notice, the possibility of being 
audited if the taxpayer disclosed the transaction, and penalties that might 
apply.95 
In Murfam Farms, the court held that the taxpayers could not rely 
on the tax opinion of a national accounting firm that sold them a tax 
shelter and received a fee equal to a percentage of the purported tax loss, 
in circumstances where the accounting firm took actions to shield itself 
from liability after the IRS announced that it would challenge similar tax 
shelters.96  The taxpayers were members of a family that disposed of the 
family business in a partially taxable transaction.97  The business had 
regularly used the accounting firm for tax advice.98  The Chief Financial 
Officer (“CFO”) of the business asked the accounting firm about 
strategies to reduce taxes on the sale.99  Partners of the accounting firm 
met with the CFO to propose a tax shelter, and there was a subsequent 
meeting with family members.100  The accounting firm’s policies 
required prospective clients for the shelter to need a desired loss of at 
least $50 million, and to be “[a]ggressive, willing to assume tax risk.”101  
No marketing documentation could be left with the client and clients 
were required to sign nondisclosure agreements.102  The engagement 
letters with clients referred to a “desired loss” of a specified amount.103  
Fees were calculated as a share of the purported tax loss.104  The 
accounting firm would arrange to have law firms issue legal opinions 
that it believed would provide clients with “penalty protection.”105 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Murfam Farms, LLC ex rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247-48 (Ct. Cl. 
2010).  The court also concluded that the taxpayers could not rely on the opinion because they 
should have recognized that the purported tax benefits were “too good to be true.”  Id. at 247. 
 97. Id. at 237-38. 
 98. Id. at 238. 
 99. Id. at 239. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 240. 
 104. Id. at 239. 
 105. Id. 
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The family members received engagement letters from the 
accounting firm shortly after the IRS had issued a notice warning 
taxpayers that certain loss-generating strategies were ineffective, and 
could subject taxpayers to penalties.106  After the IRS challenge to tax 
shelters received press attention, the accounting firm held a meeting in 
which it decided not to further market the tax shelter.107  The accounting 
firm acknowledged internally that it saw a problem with the tax shelter 
because of a “lack of meaningful potential for an economic profit or 
other business purpose to justify the transaction.”108  The accounting 
firm instructed its personnel to advise clients who previously had shown 
willingness to enter into the shelter of the heightened risk of IRS 
scrutiny and penalties.109  Nevertheless, the accounting firm instructed 
its personnel to express confidence in earlier transactions, and to try to 
avoid losing existing clients to competitors offering similar shelters.  It 
reiterated internally the importance that the tax shelter clients be 
“sophisticated investors who fully understood the economic and tax risks 
of the transaction, and who would not be likely to seek compensation 
from the accounting firm if the anticipated tax benefits were not 
ultimately realized.”110 
The accounting firm informed the CFO of the IRS notice, and 
communicated that the transaction was very risky.  But, the CFO 
responded that if he did not do a transaction with the accounting firm; he 
had other opportunities to do similar transactions with others.111  As a 
condition to proceeding with the transaction, the accounting firm 
required the family members to sign addenda to their engagement letters 
holding the accounting firm harmless from penalties that might be 
assessed against them.112  The accounting firm made another 
presentation regarding the shelter in which it characterized the shelter as 
aggressive, and arranged for a law firm to prepare the documentation 
and a tax opinion.113  The law firm did not interact directly with the 
family.114  The family paid a fee equal to two percent of the purported 
tax loss generated by the transaction to the accounting firm, and a large 
 
 106. Id. at 240. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 241. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 242. 
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fee to the law firm, even though the law firm’s tax opinion had not yet 
been sent.115 
After the family entered into the tax shelter transaction, but before 
tax returns were prepared, the accounting firm became increasingly 
uneasy with the shelter, which was receiving further press attention.116  
During this period, the IRS issued a notice describing and rebutting 
similar tax shelters, and qualifying them as “listed transactions.”117  The 
head of the accounting firm’s tax shelter marketing team recognized that 
the notice essentially described the shelter, and directed the team 
members inform clients of the notice, and indicate that the accounting 
firm would be considering its potential impact.118  When senior 
accounting firm executives expressed concern about the tax shelter 
entered into by the family, the team head assured them that the family 
had agreed to hold the accounting firm harmless from any penalties, that 
the transaction had completed, and that the law firm was planning to 
issue its opinion.119  When told of another client interested in the shelter, 
the team head refused the opportunity, noting the IRS’ intention to 
impose penalties on any taxpayer engaging in the shelter.120 
After the family completed the tax shelter transaction, the 
accounting firm prepared tax returns and charged additional fees, 
resulting in a total of 2.5 percent of the purported tax loss.121  The tax 
returns did not include specific disclosures of the strategy.122 
In 106 Ltd., the court held that the taxpayer could not rely on the 
opinion of a lawyer who solicited the taxpayer’s involvement in a tax 
shelter, structured and implemented the transaction, and conditioned his 
fee on the taxpayer going through with the transaction.123  The court also 
held that the taxpayer could not rely on the advice and tax return 
preparation work of accountants who had marketed similar tax shelters 
and charged a premium for preparing the relevant tax returns.124  The 
taxpayer was a businessman and investor who received a pitch from his 
long-time lawyer to enter into a purported investment transaction that in 
fact was a highly structured tax shelter.  The taxpayer understood that 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 242-43. 
 118. Id. at 243. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.   
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 252. 
 123. See 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67, 81 (2011). 
 124. Id.  
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the real benefit of the transaction was the purported tax reductions, not 
to generate an economic profit, and agreed to enter into the transaction 
after receiving confirmation from his accountants that they had used the 
same transaction, and after the lawyer personally promised to cover any 
taxes, penalties, or litigation costs if the transaction blew up.125  The 
lawyer provided a tax opinion that the accountants referred to in 
preparing the relevant returns.126  The opinion stated that the taxpayer 
had made various representations, that in fact were inaccurate.127  The 
lawyer received a large fee, and the accountants received a fee 
substantially greater than what they normally charged.128 
The court articulated a three-factor test for determining whether the 
taxpayer properly relied on the advice of the lawyer and the accountants:  
(1) whether the advisors were competent professionals who had 
sufficient expertise to justify reliance; (2) whether the taxpayer provided 
the necessary and accurate information to the advisors; and (3) whether 
the taxpayer actually relied in good faith on the advisor’s judgment.129  
The court found the first two factors present, but concluded that the 
taxpayer did not actually rely in good faith on the advice of the lawyer 
and the accountants for three reasons.130  First, the court found that the 
taxpayer’s high level of business sophistication and expertise “ma[de] it 
harder to believe that he didn’t know the transaction was improper.”131  
Second, the court found that the taxpayer should have been alerted by 
the inaccurate statements in the opinion that purported to set forth the 
taxpayer’s representations.  As the court stated, “[o]ne doesn’t need look 
very hard to find problems with Garza’s opinion.”132 
Third, the court determined that the lawyer and the accountants 
were “promoters” of the transaction, whose advice was inherently 
unreliable.133  In making this determination, the court sought to 
articulate the factors characterizing a promoter.134  It defined a promoter 
as “an advisor who participated in structuring the transaction or is 
otherwise related to, has an interest in, or profits from the 
 
 125. Id. at 70. 
 126. Id. at 72. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 73. 
 129. Id. at 77. 
 130. Id. at 77-78. 
 131. Id. at 78. 
 132. Id. at 79. 
 133. Id. at 81. 
 134. Id. at 79-80. 
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transaction.”135  The court noted that “[o]ne might need to be careful in 
applying the definition to some kinds of transactions,” stating that a tax 
lawyer asked by a businessman for advice on how to sell the family 
business through a tax-favored stock redemption might be said to have 
“participated in the transaction.”136  However, the court found the 
definition workable “when the transaction involved is the same tax 
shelter offered to numerous parties.”137  Finally, court stated that a tax 
advisor is not a “promoter” of a tax shelter transaction where the 
advisor: 
• Has a long-term and continual relationship with the client; 
• Does not give unsolicited advice regarding the tax shelter; 
• Advises only within the advisor’s field of expertise (and not 
because of the advisor’s regular involvement in the transaction 
being scrutinized); 
• Follows the advisor’s regular course of conduct in rendering the 
advice; and 
• Has no stake in the transaction besides what the advisor bills at 
the advisor’s regular hourly rate.138 
Factually, it is not difficult to conclude that the tax advisor’s 
opinion in 106 Ltd. was unreliable.  The lawyer solicited the taxpayer to 
enter into the transaction, which had no meaningful purpose other than 
to avoid taxes.  The lawyer’s opinion contained misleading statements to 
disguise the weakness of the taxpayer’s position, and the lawyer and the 
accountants were paid substantial sums to implement and report the 
transaction.  However, the Tax Court’s narrow definition of the 
circumstances where a tax advisor will not be treated as a promoter 
reaches substantially beyond the facts of the case.139 
 
 135. Id. at 79 (quoting Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1622 (2009)). 
 136. Id. at 80. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (citing Countryside Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 347, 352-55 (2009)). 
 139. The circumstances articulated by the Tax Court in 106 Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 67 
(2011), where a tax advisor is not a “promoter,” was based on its opinion in Countryside Ltd. 
Partnership v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 347 (2009).  In that case, the court held that the so-called 
federally authorized tax practitioner (“FATP”) privilege set forth in Code § 7525(a) applied to 
advice because it was not provided in connection with promoting corporate participation in a tax 
shelter.  The IRS asserted that the accountant in question was involved in organizing, structuring, 
and assisting with respect to certain tax shelter transactions.  The court found that the accountant 
had a long, close relationship with the taxpayer, preparing returns, assisting with tax planning when 
asked, answering questions when asked, and responding to notices and inquiries from federal and 
state tax officials.  The court further found that his advice with respect to the transactions in 
question was furnished (as was similar advice with respect to similar transactions) as part of a long-
standing, ongoing, and hence, routine relationship with the taxpayer.  The accountant provided tax 
advice to the taxpayer when requested to do so, and his advice provided in connection with the 
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The definition articulated by the court in 106 Ltd. implies that a tax 
advisor who provides advice regarding a marketed tax shelter will be 
treated as a promoter if any of the requirements listed above are missing.  
For example, if a taxpayer seeks out a tax advisor with whom the 
taxpayer has had no prior relationship, that tax advisor apparently would 
be treated as a promoter under the court’s test, even if the tax advisor 
serves in purely an advisory role to the taxpayer, charges standard hourly 
rates, and has no other connection with the transaction.  This per se 
approach is troubling because it does not consider whether, under the 
specific facts and circumstances of the case, the advisor was subject to 
any meaningful temptation to provide distorted advice, or how the 
advisor may have responded to any such temptation.  As discussed 
below, other courts have specifically rejected a per se rule because the 
determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in 
good faith is to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all 
pertinent facts and circumstances.140  A per se test of the type articulated 
by the court in 106 Ltd. is inconsistent with the purpose of the 
reasonable cause and good faith exception to shield taxpayers that did 
not have reason to know their positions were incorrect.  Specifically, a 
per se test does not evaluate the taxpayer’s efforts to assess its proper tax 
liability, or the reasonableness of the taxpayer under the circumstances 
to rely on the tax advisor’s opinion. 
 
transactions followed the same regular course of procedure as did his other tax advice, including 
with respect to similar transactions.  The accounting firm with which he was employed had no stake 
in the outcome of the transactions other than the continued retention of the taxpayer as a client.  It 
did not receive a fixed fee or a fee based on a percentage of some claimed tax saving.  It was paid 
by the hour pursuant to the accountant’s normal rate schedule.  On that basis, the court stated that:  
[t]here may be a point at which an FATP’s actions cross the line, and will no longer be 
encompassed within the routine relationship between an FATP and his client and will 
amount to tax shelter promotion.  Respondent has, however, failed to show us that Mr. 
Egan’s communications with the Winn organization with respect to the partnership 
redemptions and associated transactions before us crossed that line. 
In making its decision, the court referred to the legislative history of the FATP privilege, which 
expressed the Conference Committee’s anticipation that the tax shelter limitation to the FATP 
privilege would not adversely affect “the routine relationship between a tax practitioner and a 
client.”  Id. at 353-54 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 269 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)).  The court did 
not articulate a specific test defining when such a routine relationship would exist, or assert that it 
would only exist under circumstances similar to the facts found in Countryside.  Given the highly 
factual determination of the court in Countryside, and that the case did not address whether a 
taxpayer could rely on an opinion to avoid penalties, the decision provides little support for the 
precise test articulated by the court in 106 Ltd. 
 140. See also Allison v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 568, 587-88 (Ct. Cl. 2006) (rejecting a per 
se rule in the context of advice provided by an investment advisor and an accountant who assisted in 
due diligence of a tax shelter investment). 
25
Moldenhauer: Penalty Protection Opinions and Advisor Conflicts of Interest
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
9- MOLDENHAUER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:24 PM 
80 AKRON TAX JOURNAL [27:55 
B. Tax Advisors Having Referral Relationships with Promoters 
When a tax shelter promoter refers a taxpayer to a tax advisor, it is 
reasonable to assume that the promoter is confident that the tax advisor 
will provide favorable advice.  The tax advisor may have an explicit 
agreement or an implicit understanding with the promoter that the tax 
advisor will provide favorable advice, and that in exchange the promoter 
will make additional referrals.141  In those circumstances, courts 
generally have found the tax advisors’ opinions unreliable. 
For example, in Alpha I, a tax shelter promoter referred the 
taxpayer to a lawyer to obtain an opinion.142  The promoter had 
promised the taxpayers that the strategy would eliminate taxes, and that 
by receiving the opinion the taxpayers would avoid any penalties if the 
strategy was ineffective.  The court held that the taxpayers could not rely 
on the opinion because (1) the opinion was obtained under an assurance 
from the promoter that it would protect the taxpayers from penalties, (2) 
the taxpayers failed to inform the law firm that the promoter had 
promised that the strategy would eliminate taxes, and (3) the opinion 
recited that the taxpayers would not pay fees to any adviser based on tax 
savings from the strategy when in fact the promoter would receive 25% 
of the tax savings.143  In this decision, the court did not specifically 
conclude that the law firm had intentionally included the 
misrepresentation, recognizing the possibility that the taxpayers had 
failed to provide that information to the law firm regarding the fees 
charged by the promoter.  However, the court noted the fact that the law 
firm received a flat fee of $300,000 for the opinion and concluded that 
given the taxpayers’ level of education and sophistication, they failed to 
establish that their reliance on the opinion was reasonable and 
undertaken in good faith.144 
Reading between the lines, the court in Alpha I seems to have 
thought it likely that all participants—the taxpayers, the promoter, and 
the law firm—intended the opinion to be window dressing to protect 
against penalties in case the strategy was discovered by the IRS and 
disallowed.  The misrepresentation in the opinion about fees not being 
based on the claimed tax savings suggested an intention to mislead the 
 
 141. If the tax advisor complies with Circular 230, the taxpayer will have been informed in the 
opinion of the referral arrangement. 
 142. Alpha I, L.P. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 280 (Ct. Cl. 2010). 
 143. Id. at 315-18, 324-26. 
 144. Id. at 317. 
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IRS and the courts on the part of the taxpayers, if not on the part of the 
law firm. 
By contrast, in Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United 
States,145 the court held that the taxpayers could rely in part on an 
opinion furnished by a law firm that also represented the tax shelter 
promoter.146  The court noted that the opinion “provided a reasonable 
interpretation of the law,” and that the taxpayers provided expert 
testimony that the opinions had complied with standards common to the 
profession and with the administrative standards of conduct for tax 
practitioners under Circular 230.147  The court dismissed the conflict of 
interest resulting from the law firm’s representation of the promoter by 
noting that the taxpayers (themselves lawyers) “concluded that there 
would be no conflict of interest with Holland & Hart’s representation of 
Presidio because their interests in the tax treatment of their investments 
were the same.”148 
The court’s analysis of the conflict of interest issue in Klamath 
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding.  Obviously, both the taxpayers 
and the promoter stood to gain if the strategy was upheld, or if the 
opinion succeeded, in preventing the imposition of penalties.  However, 
that very fact made it less likely that a law firm associated with the 
promoter could be counted on to provide a fair assessment of the 
likelihood that the tax shelter would successfully reduce the taxpayers’ 
tax liability.149 
 
 
 145. Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 
2007), aff’d on other grounds, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 146. Id. at 904-05. 
 147. Id. at 905. 
 148. Id. 
 149. There also are a number of other points in the opinion where one could ask whether the 
court failed to apply a sufficient level of skepticism.  For example, the court’s acceptance of the 
taxpayers’ claims that they only discovered that the highly structured tax shelter generated 
significant purported tax losses after they had completed the transaction.  Id. at 893.  In NPR 
Investments, LLC v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. Tex. 2010), the same group of 
ultimate individual taxpayers plus a third partner in their law firm entered in to another, similar, tax 
shelter in the subsequent year.  The IRS asserted penalties and the matter was tried before the same 
U.S. federal judge as had decided Klamath.  The court again held for the taxpayer finding facts that 
strain credulity particularly in light of facts that the court previously had found in Klamath.  For 
example, in Klamath, the court found that the taxpayers learned of the tax benefits from the first tax 
shelter in a discussion with their accountants near the end of 2000.  Klamath, 472 F. Supp. 2d at 
893.  Nevertheless, in NPR Investments, the court found that the taxpayers did not discuss tax 
benefits in a conversation with the same accountants about the second tax shelter that occurred 
sometime in 2001, but no later than the summer.  NPR Invs., 732 F. Supp. 2d at 679. 
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C. Tax Advisors that are Developers or Implementers of a Tax 
Strategy 
In cases where a tax advisor has developed a tax-reduction strategy, 
or implements the strategy, the tax advisor in some sense is committed 
to a position that the strategy is effective.  The tax advisor may have 
invested considerable resources in developing the strategy, or may have 
committed to the taxpayer at the outset of the transaction to provide a 
favorable opinion.  The tax advisor also may have a financial interest in 
providing a favorable opinion, either because the advisor is charging a 
premium fee for the tax strategy, or because the tax advisor will receive 
lower fees if the transaction does not complete.150  Finally, the tax 
advisor may be in a position to modify the relevant facts in a way that 
helps support a favorable opinion.  As discussed below, courts have 
taken different views on how those circumstances affect the reliability of 
the tax advisor’s opinion. 
In American Boat, the taxpayer engaged a lawyer to restructure his 
ownership of towboats following a nearly catastrophic marine 
accident.151  The lawyer, who later was indicted for promoting invalid 
tax shelters, had previously assisted the taxpayer by developing and 
implementing an estate plan that included a highly structured tax 
shelter.152  In restructuring the taxpayer’s towboat holding structure, the 
lawyer again included a highly structured tax shelter, and provided an 
opinion to the taxpayer.153  The taxpayer provided the opinion to a 
national accounting firm for purposes of preparing the tax returns of the 
relevant entities, and the accountants informed the taxpayer both that 
they considered the legal position taken in the opinion to be accurate, 
and that they had implemented the same strategy for some of their other 
clients and could have done the same for the taxpayer.154  The taxpayer 
claimed not to know or have reason to know at the time of the 
transaction that the taxpayer or the law firms with which he was 
 
 150. The fact that a tax advisor’s fee is payable only if the advisor is able to render a favorable 
opinion does not in itself cause the fee to depend on the taxpayer realizing the intended tax benefits.  
Therefore that fact should not cause the transaction to be a reportable transaction and subject the 
opinion to the more stringent rules of I.R.C. § 6664(d) (2006) discussed above. 
 151. Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 152. Id. at 474-75. 
 153. Id. at 475-76. 
 154. Id. at 476.  The taxpayer and his companies later changed their accounting firm to a 
regional firm, which raised no concern regarding the tax position taken on the relevant returns.  Id. 
at 477. 
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associated during the course of the transaction155 had structured similar 
transactions for other taxpayers.156  Moreover, the District Court found 
that, at the time of the transaction, the taxpayer had no reason to suspect 
the quality of the tax opinion, and the Court of Appeals held that the 
opinion met the specific requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c).157 
The government argued that the taxpayer’s reliance on the opinion 
was not reasonable for a number of reasons:  (1) he paid a large flat fee 
to the lawyer to structure the transactions, (2) the tax advice provided by 
the lawyer was distinct from any advice regarding tort liability, (3) the 
opinion contained representations that the taxpayer knew or should have 
known were false, and (4) the transactions provided a large tax benefit 
for minimal risk, which the taxpayer should have known was too good to 
be true.158  The court held that the large fee paid to the lawyer was not 
sufficient reason to treat the taxpayer’s reliance on the opinion as 
unreasonable, and rejected the position advanced by the government that 
advice is per se unreliable when the tax advisor incorporates a potential 
tax shelter into a restructuring plan.159  The court acknowledged that in 
many instances, a taxpayer might be unreasonable in relying on an 
advisor who stands to gain significantly from a transaction, but noted 
that the flat fee covered not only the tax shelter but also significant work 
restructuring the taxpayer’s various business entities in response to 
liability concerns.160  The court specifically accepted the District Court’s 
finding that the taxpayer did not pay the fee thinking that as 
consideration he was getting a tax shelter. 
The court refused to find the taxpayer’s reliance on the opinion to 
be unreasonable because the tax advice from the lawyer was distinct 
from any advice the lawyer may have provided regarding tort liability.  
The District Court found that taxpayer had approached the lawyer to 
reorganize his business to reduce potential liability, not to implement a 
tax shelter, and that the shelter was never marketed to the taxpayer.161  
On that basis, the Court of Appeals concluded that the lawyer’s 
overarching counsel was to reorganize, and that the taxpayer relied in 
 
 155. During the course of the transaction, the lawyer moved his practice to the same J&G law 
firm that appeared in Stobie Creek Investments LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), and New Phoenix Sunrise v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 161, 194 (2009). 
 156. Am. Boat, 583 F.3d at 477. 
 157. Id. at 485-86. 
 158. Id. at 484-85. 
 159. Id. at 483. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 485. 
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part on the lawyer’s recommended means of doing so, which included 
the tax shelter.162 
The court refused to accept the government’s position that the tax 
opinion was unreliable in that it contained representations that the 
taxpayer knew or should have known were false, particularly that the 
transactions in the tax shelter had a non-tax business purpose and that 
the taxpayer sought an economic profit.163  The court acknowledged that 
the tax shelter transactions were unlikely at best to realize a profit.164  
However, the court accepted the District Court’s finding that the 
taxpayer did not know the transactions held no profit potential, or that 
specific factual assertions in the opinion were incorrect.165 
Finally, the court refused to accept the government’s position that 
the taxpayer’s reliance was unreasonable because the tax benefits were 
too good to be true, and accordingly the taxpayer should have known 
that something was awry.166  The court noted that a national accounting 
firm had specifically agreed with the position and had informed the 
taxpayer that it was structuring similar transactions, that the taxpayer 
had engaged in a similar tax shelter transaction in connection with his 
earlier estate planning that had not been challenged by the IRS, and that 
the taxpayer had engaged in another tax-motivated business 
reorganization.167 
The conclusion to be drawn from American Boat seems to be that a 
tax advisor will not be treated as providing inherently unreliable advice 
merely because the advisor encourages the taxpayer to incorporate 
aggressive tax planning in a legitimate business transaction, and receives 
a large fee for doing so, where the taxpayer did not seek out the advisor 
to reduce taxes.  However, the Tax Court’s decision in Canal Corp.,168 
discussed below, makes clear that a disqualifying conflict of interest 
may be found even in circumstances where the tax advisor assists in 
structuring and implementing a legitimate business transaction. 
In Canal Corp., 169 the taxpayer engaged an investment bank and 
an accounting firm with which it had a long-term relationship to jointly 
develop a strategy for disposing of a business that had a fair market 
value substantially in excess of its tax basis.  The investment bank and 
 
 162. Id. at 484. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 484-85. 
 166. Id. at 485-86. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T. C. 199 (2010). 
 169. Id. 
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accounting firm proposed a structure where the taxpayer and a party that 
wanted to purchase the business would contribute their respective 
businesses to a joint venture, the joint venture would borrow funds that 
would be distributed to the taxpayer, and the taxpayer would provide a 
limited indemnity covering the joint venture’s borrowing.170  The 
structure was intended to avoid treatment as a “disguised sale”171 and 
thus defer the recognition of gain on the cash distribution to the 
taxpayer.  The accounting firm assisted in structuring and negotiating the 
joint venture, and rendered an opinion that the cash distribution would 
not be treated as a disguised sale.172  The taxpayer agreed to pay the 
accounting firm an $800,000 fixed fee at the closing of the transaction, 
and the taxpayer indicated that it would proceed with the transaction 
only if it received a favorable tax opinion from the accounting firm.173 
The court concluded that the transaction would be treated as a 
disguised sale because the limited indemnity did not impose meaningful 
economic risk of loss on the taxpayer, and was structured primarily to 
create an appearance of shifting risk of loss to the taxpayer.174  The court 
upheld the imposition of a substantial underpayment penalty, holding 
that the taxpayer had not established that it had reasonable cause, and 
had acted in good faith, in claiming tax deferral.175  Specifically, the 
court held that the taxpayer could not rely on the accounting firm’s 
opinion to establish reasonable cause and good faith because the opinion 
was based on questionable conclusions and unreasonable 
assumptions,176 showed a lack of care in its preparation,177 and was 
prepared by a tax advisor with inherent conflicts of interest.178 
The Canal Corp. decision does not articulate a specific test for 
determining when a tax advisor will have an impermissible conflict of 
interest for purposes of the reasonable cause and good faith exception.  
However, the case considers many of the same factors identified in 106 
Ltd. as relevant to determining “promoter” status.  In favor of allowing 
the taxpayer to rely on the opinion were the facts that the accounting 
 
 170. See generally id. 
 171. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 172. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 205-08 (rendering of PWC Tax Opinion). 
 173. Id. at 206. 
 174. Id. at 216-17. 
 175. Id. at 221-22. 
 176. Id. at 219. 
 177. Id.  The Court questioned how much time could have been devoted to the draft opinion 
because it was littered with typographical errors, and was disorganized and incomplete. 
 178. Id. at 218.  A professional tax advisor with a stake in the outcome has a conflict of 
interest.   
31
Moldenhauer: Penalty Protection Opinions and Advisor Conflicts of Interest
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
9- MOLDENHAUER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:24 PM 
86 AKRON TAX JOURNAL [27:55 
firm had a long-term relationship with the taxpayer, and was engaged to 
structure a legitimate business transaction.179  On the other hand, the 
accounting firm structured the transaction with an objective of reducing 
taxes.  The advisor helped negotiate and implement the transaction, and 
made certain factual determinations to which he referred in the 
opinion.180  The opinion relied on agreements with the other party to the 
transaction where there was little commercial negotiation, because the 
provisions were viewed as important only to supporting the taxpayer’s 
tax strategy by creating the appearance of economic substance.181  The 
accounting firm’s fee was a fixed amount, not calculated based on time 
spent,182 and was effectively payable only if the accounting firm was 
able to render a favorable opinion because the fee was payable only on 
the completion of the transaction, and the taxpayer would not close the 
transaction without receiving a favorable opinion.183  The court 
characterized fee as the “exorbitant price tag” for “an insurance policy as 
to the taxability of the transaction.”184  More generally, the court found 
the opinion unpersuasive and result-oriented.185 
Nevertheless, as other commentators also have noted, there is 
something troubling about the Canal Corp. decision.186  This was not a 
case where a taxpayer sought to derive benefits that it should have 
 
 179. See Bubel, supra note 11, at 844-45 (discussing cases where courts found the taxpayer’s 
long-standing relationship with a tax advisor as a factor justifying the taxpayer’s reliance on the tax 
advisor’s opinion). 
 180. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 220 (“[w]e would be hard pressed to identify which of the hats 
Mr. Miller was wearing in rendering that tax opinion.  There were too many.”). 
 181. Id. at 221 (“[i]n essence, Mr. Miller issued an opinion on a transaction he helped plan 
without the normal give-and-take in negotiating terms with an outside party.”). 
 182. The court expressed doubt that the fee charged reflected the amount of work involved, 
noting that the opinion was “littered with typographical errors, disorganized and incomplete.”  Id. at 
219.  The court questioned whether “any firm would have had such a cavalier approach if the firm 
was being compensated solely for time devoted to rendering the opinion.”  Id.  Also, the court noted 
that the author of the opinion failed to recognize several parts of the opinion.  Id. 
 183. As the court noted, the accounting firm “therefore had a large stake in making sure the 
closing occurred.”  Id. at 221. 
 184. Id. 
 185. The court found it “unreasonable that anyone, let alone an attorney, would issue the 
highest level opinion a firm offers on such dubious legal reasoning [as was contained in the 
opinion].”  Id. at 219.  (The author of the opinion was a licensed attorney, though he was not a 
practicing attorney at the time he gave the legal opinion).  The court concluded that “no lesser level 
of comfort would have commanded the $800,000 fixed fee that Chesapeake paid for the opinion.”  
Id. at 220. 
 186. See Blake D. Rubin, Andrea Macintosh Whiteway & Jon G. Finkelstein, Tax Court Goes 
Overboard in Canal,  TAX NOTES 185, 193-95 (2011); Richard M. Lipton & Todd D. Golub, The 
Tax Court Drains Canal Corporation’s Leveraged Partnership Transaction, 113 J. TAX’N 340, 351-
53 (2010). 
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known were unrealistic.  The tax planning related to a legitimate 
business transaction and the tax deferral strategy, which was well known 
and accepted within the profession,187 was proposed by a leading 
investment bank and a leading accounting firm.  Moreover, it is 
frequently the case that a tax advisor will negotiate tax-sensitive 
provisions of commercial agreements, and that the other party to the 
transaction will consider the provisions to have little commercial 
relevance other than to ensure that the taxpayer achieves a particular tax 
treatment.  Tax-deferred corporate reorganizations and like-kind 
exchanges are just a few examples of transactions where minor 
variations in the commercial terms can affect one party’s tax treatment 
while having little commercial or tax effect on the other party.188  In a 
number of recent cases where courts have criticized the participation of 
tax advisors in the structuring and documentation of tax shelters, they 
have distinguished situations where a legitimate business transaction is 
structured to minimize taxes.189 
 
 187. See, e.g., Louis S. Freeman, Dean S. Shulman, Victor Hollender & Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, 
The Partnership Union:  Opportunities for Joint Ventures and Divestitures, 910 PLI/TAX 1-1 
(2010); Eric B. Sloan, Steven E. Klig & Judd A. Sher, Through the Looking Glass:  Seeing 
Corporate Problems as Partnership Opportunities, 869 PLI/TAX 833 (2009); Lewis R. Steinberg & 
Robert Willens, Hot Topics & Cutting-Edge Structures, SP051 ALI-ABA 403 (2009); Lewis R. 
Steinberg, The Use of Partnerships to Dispose of Appreciated Corporate Assets, 569 PLI/TAX 1023 
(2003). 
 188. See, e.g., DeCleene v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 457, 475-77 (1993) (reliance by taxpayer on 
accountants and attorneys who structured and implemented purported like-kind exchange sufficient 
to avoid penalties).  See generally James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters:  Old “Brine” 
in New Bottles, 55 TAX L. REV. 135, 155-56 (2002) (footnotes omitted): 
At the other end of the spectrum are transactions that, while arguably aggressive (and 
certainly imaginative), most would agree should not be branded as abusive ‘tax shelters’ 
although they certainly were tax savers.  Seagram merely followed a published revenue 
ruling, while Esmark selected the low-tax path to a given end in a situation where two 
other equally plausible, thought higher taxed, alternative routes also were available; the 
Service was not allowed to resequence Esmark’s transaction into the high-tax channels.  
Cottage Savings’ mortgage pool swaps, while they were tax-motivated and did not result 
in a meaningful change in its economic position, involved a case where recognition of an 
actual accrued economic loss merely was being accelerated for tax purposes.  Form has 
always occupied a major role in subchapter C and will no doubt continue to do so.  
Exploiting the many weaknesses in the mostly mechanical rules of subchapter C is an 
old sport that is ever new.  While many of these transactions are tax-driven (even 
predominantly so), they probably do not deserve to be stigmatized as abusive tax 
shelters. 
 189. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“Jeffrey Welles sought out and selected the J&G strategy because of a desire to avoid taxes that 
would otherwise be owed on the Therma-Tru deal, not because he wanted to structure the deal itself 
to minimize taxes”); 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67,  80 (2011) (“[o]ne might need to be careful 
in applying the definition to some kinds of transactions–a tax lawyer asked by a businessman for 
advice on how to sell the family business through a tax-favored stock redemption might be said to 
33
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In Canal Corp., the court did not state that a taxpayer may never 
rely on the opinion of a tax advisor who has participated in structuring 
and negotiating the relevant transaction, but instead criticized the 
manner in which the transaction was structured, the manner in which the 
tax advisor developed the facts on which the opinion was based, and the 
legal reasoning underlying the opinion.190  The court’s criticisms largely 
concerned the manner in which the tax advisor approached the question 
of how much assets the obligor under the indemnity should retain to 
avoid disguised sale treatment.  The tax advisor had recommended that 
the obligor maintain at least 20% of its maximum exposure under the 
indemnity.191  Although the taxpayer followed that advice for as long as 
the indemnity was outstanding, the court concluded that the opinion was 
based on unreasonable assumptions because no agreement with the other 
party to the transaction required the obligor under the indemnity to 
maintain a specified level of assets or net worth.192 
The court also criticized the fact that the advisor assumed that the 
indemnity would be effective, and that the entity granting the indemnity 
would hold sufficient assets to permit the liabilities covered by the 
indemnity to be allocated to the taxpayer.193  The court concluded that 
the factual analysis in the opinion was tainted by the advisor’s “audit” of 
the assets of the joint venture and the entity granting the indemnity, and 
by the fact that the tax advisor made legal assumptions separate from the 
tax assumptions in the opinion and reviewed state law to make sure the 
assumptions were valid regarding whether a partnership was formed.194 
The court faulted the legal analysis in the opinion that the 
indemnity would have substance if the entity maintained assets of at 
 
have ‘participated in structuring the transaction’–but when the transaction involved is the same tax 
shelter offered to numerous parties, the definition is workable.”).  Cf. Am. Boat Co. v. United 
States, 583 F.3d  471, 483 (7th Cir. 2009): 
Mayer received a flat fee for his services–which, importantly, included not only an 
impermissible transaction, but also significant work restructuring Jump’s various 
business entities in response to concerns about his companies’ liability.  To accept the 
government’s argument would mean that a taxpayer may never rely upon the legal 
advice of the same adviser who counsels the individual on restructuring . . . Jump’s 
reliance on Mayer’s advice was not per se unreasonable simply because he also advised 
Jump on restructuring his business. 
 190. Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T. C. 199 (2010). 
 191. Id. at 206. 
 192. The court considered the fact that the taxpayer extracted assets from the entity in the year 
that the joint venture terminated as indicating that the arrangements to maintain assets in the entity 
“served to create merely the appearance, rather than the reality, of economic risk for a portion of the 
LLC debt.”  Id. at 214. 
 193. Id. at 220. 
 194. Id. at 221. 
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least 20% of the maximum exposure.  Specifically, the court determined 
that the advisor should not have relied by analogy, in the absence of case 
law or Code authority, on an obsolete revenue procedure that set forth 
guidelines under which the IRS would provide a ruling on a different 
issue, and characterized such conclusions as faulty “legal assumptions” 
that made the opinion unreliable for penalty protection purposes.195  The 
court found it objectionable that the advisor was willing to render a 
“should” level opinion, which was the highest level of opinion that the 
accounting firm offered to its clients, and which reflected a position that 
was materially higher than a “more likely than not” opinion.196 
It is difficult to see how any of the court’s criticisms described 
above are a basis for denying the taxpayer the ability to rely on the tax 
advisor’s opinion.  The absence of a contractual obligation to maintain a 
minimum level of assets to support the indemnity does not alter the fact 
that the obligor in fact maintained the recommended amount of assets at 
all relevant times.197  The taxpayer clearly understood and accepted that 
maintaining assets in the entity was necessary to achieve the desired tax 
treatment, and there is no indication that the taxpayer intended to shield 
those assets from any liability that might arise under the indemnity.198 
Likewise, there was no indication that the tax advisor’s factual or 
non-tax legal assumptions per se were incorrect.  The court’s decision 
contains no suggestion, for example, that the indemnity was legally 
ineffective or that the taxpayer would not maintain assets of at least 20% 
 
 195. Id. at 219.  Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. 2003-99, 
2003-2 C.B. 388, stated that the IRS generally would rule that an organization lacked limited 
liability for purposes of determining partnership status under prior regulations, if the net worth of 
the corporate general partner equaled at least 10% of the total contributions to the limited 
partnership and was expected to continue to equal at least 10% throughout the life of the 
partnership. 
 196. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 219. 
 197. Without an obligation to maintain assets in the entity, the taxpayer had the opportunity to 
extract assets in the event that facts indicated the indemnity would be called upon.  No such event 
occurred, and the court recognized that such a move would create a potential cause of action for 
fraudulent conveyance.  Id. at 216.  The court viewed the potential for such a claim as insufficient to 
create economic risk of loss; however the court did not directly address the fact that a fraudulent 
conveyance action could interfere with a move, if there were signs of trouble, to extract the assets 
that it voluntarily maintained in the entity. 
 198. One commentator has questioned whether there is legal authority to support the position 
that voluntarily maintaining assets is sufficient.  Michael L. Schler, Questions About the Canal 
Case, 130 TAX NOTES 971 (2011).  However, assuming that no authority existed either way at the 
time the opinion was rendered, and that the taxpayer did in fact intend to maintain assets for so long 
as the indemnity was outstanding, it seems reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on the opinion of the 
tax advisor that assets maintained voluntarily are sufficient to create economic substance.  Although 
others may disagree, this does not appear to be the type of conclusion that even a sophisticated 
taxpayer should have considered “too good to be true.” 
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of the maximum exposure under the indemnity.199  The court’s criticism 
of the tax advisor’s actions to verify certain facts and non-tax legal 
conclusions is particularly difficult to fathom.  The facts in question 
included financial facts and conclusions under relevant state law.  There 
is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the tax advisor, who was a 
partner in an accounting firm and a licensed attorney, did not have the 
necessary expertise and institutional resources to review those facts and 
legal conclusions. 
The regulations regarding reliance on an opinion to avoid penalties 
specifically state that “[t]he advice must be based upon all pertinent facts 
and circumstances and the law as it relates to those facts and 
circumstances,”200 and “must not be based on unreasonable factual or 
legal assumptions . . . and must not unreasonably rely on the 
representations, statements, findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or 
any other person.”201  If anything, those standards require the tax advisor 
to consider the veracity and plausibility of the factual material on which 
the opinion is based, to make relevant inquiries and to draw appropriate 
conclusions.  This approach is consistent with the ethical and regulatory 
requirements imposed directly on practitioners.202  Needless to say, an 
opinion may involve factual issues in which the tax advisor does not 
have the necessary competence, and must rely on experts.  However, the 
implication in the court’s decision that all factual assumptions must be 
 
 199. The court characterizes the opinion as making the factual assumption that the entity 
“would hold assets sufficient to avoid the anti-abuse rule.”  However, the description of the opinion 
strongly suggests that it did not “assume away the very crux of whether the transaction would 
qualify as a nontaxable contribution to a partnership.”  Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 220.  Rather, as far 
as can be gathered from the court’s decision, the opinion appears to have made a factual assumption 
that the entity would maintain assets of at least 20% of the maximum exposure under the indemnity, 
and concluded based on the analogy to the revenue procedure and the regulatory interpretation 
discussed above, that such assets would be sufficient. 
 200. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003). 
 201. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii). 
 202. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(d) (2011): 
[a] practitioner advising a client to take a position on a tax return . . . generally may rely 
in good faith without verification upon information furnished by the client.  The 
practitioner may not, however, ignore the implications of information furnished to, or 
actually known by, the practitioner, and must make reasonable inquiries if the 
information as furnished appears to be incorrect, inconsistent with an important fact or 
another factual assumption, or incomplete 
31 C.F.R. § 10.37(a) (2011): 
[a] practitioner must not give written advice . . . concerning one or more Federal tax 
issues if the practitioner bases the written advice on unreasonable factual or legal 
assumptions . . . unreasonably relies upon representations, statements, findings or 
agreements of the taxpayer or any other person, [or] does not consider all relevant facts 
that the practitioner knows or should know . . . . 
36
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol27/iss1/3
9- MOLDENHAUER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:24 PM 
2012] PENALTY PROTECTION OPINIONS 91 
independently validated appears nowhere in the relevant regulations, and 
as a per se rule would do little to ensure the reliability of opinions. 
The court’s criticisms of the tax advisor’s legal analysis are faulty 
in two regards.  Most importantly, it is well established that a court may 
not deny a taxpayer the ability to rely on a legal opinion of a qualified 
advisor merely because it disagrees with the analysis in the opinion, 
assuming that the taxpayer itself does not know or have reason to know 
that the analysis is faulty or “too good to be true.”203  The court 
therefore was not justified in disqualifying the opinion by characterizing 
the tax advisor’s legal conclusions as faulty “legal assumptions.”204  As 
is frequently the case, there was no directly applicable authority and the 
tax advisor was required to reach his conclusions by relying on 
analogous authority and by extrapolating from postulates given in the 
regulations.205  To all appearances, the tax advisor reached the legal 
conclusions in the opinion based on the guidance that he thought was 
 
 203. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985): 
[w]hen an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as 
whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice.  Most 
taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or 
attorney.  To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a ‘second opinion,’ 
or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very 
purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place. . . . ‘Ordinary 
business care and prudence’ does not demand such actions. 
 204. In Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 210 (D. Conn. 
2004), aff’d 150 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2005), the court similarly characterized legal conclusions 
with which it disagreed as “legal assumptions.”  See also Bubel, supra note 11, at 871: 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii) includes a proscription against unreasonable legal 
assumptions.  While not explicitly requiring citations to legal authority in the same 
jurisdiction, it would seem to be somewhat difficult to meet this requirement by ignoring 
relevant authority within the jurisdiction if it bears directly on the facts at hand. 
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Long Term Capital Holdings concluded that the District Court had 
faulted the inadequate legal analysis because it demonstrated that the opinion was based on “flawed 
and outcome-determinative assumptions Long-Term asked it to make,” and “not because it expected 
Long-Term to engage in sophisticated questioning of its expert advice.” Long Term Capital 
Holdings, 150 Fed. Appx. at 43 n.1.  See Prescott, supra note 8, at 1009 (discussing the Second 
Circuit opinion). 
 205. See, e.g., Lawsky, supra note 11, at 1037-38 (noting that the determination whether a 
technically compliant transaction violates the substance or intent of the law ultimately can only be 
made by a court and therefore cannot be predicted with certainty by a tax advisor). 
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most relevant.206  The regulations specifically contemplate this type of 
analysis.207 
Moreover, the court’s conclusion that the taxpayer’s position “did 
not warrant a ‘should’ opinion” is irrelevant because it tests the opinion 
against a higher standard than the “more likely than not” standard called 
for in the applicable regulations.208  Finally, it is doubtful that any better 
judgment would have been reached by requiring the taxpayer to review 
the analogous authority (or find its own analogy).  Specifically, it is 
doubtful that a taxpayer knowing the need to leave assets in the entity 
granting the indemnity, and that there was a very low probability of the 
indemnity being called upon, would conclude that the tax law required 
the assets to be more than 20% of the maximum exposure under the 
indemnity.209  Likewise, it is doubtful that a taxpayer intending to leave 
assets in the entity, and knowing it could be exposed to a fraudulent 
conveyance claim if it extracted the assets when there were signs of 
trouble, would conclude that the tax law required it also to commit in the 
indemnity to maintain those assets.210 
The court’s conclusions about the fee arrangements in Canal Corp. 
also are unpersuasive.  The court levied three main criticisms:  first, the 
accounting firm charged a high fee for what the court viewed to be a low 
 
 206. The court criticized the use of the words “it appears” in the opinion’s interpretation of the 
relevant regulation.  Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T. C. 199, 220 (2010).  The court appears to have 
interpreted those words as an abdication of responsibility by the tax advisor for the legal conclusion, 
but more likely they were an honest expression that the tax advisor reached the conclusions without 
directly applicable authority, and that other conclusions were possible. 
 207. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (2011) (“[t]there may be substantial authority 
for the treatment of an item despite the absence of certain types of authority.  Thus, a taxpayer may 
have substantial authority for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned construction of 
the applicable statutory provision.”). 
 208. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(B) (2011).  Canal Corp. is not the first case where a court 
objected to the willingness of a tax advisor to provide a “should” opinion that it disagreed with.  See 
Long Term Capital Holdings, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 210-11: 
Finally, no other evidence such as companion memoranda discussing the application of 
[various relevant authorities] to the actual facts of the OTC transaction was offered to 
show research for King & Spalding’s legal analysis and opinions.  Such background 
research does not involve obscure or inaccessible caselaw references, is basic to a sound 
legal product, especially for [a] ‘should’ legal opinion and a premium of $400,000.  With 
hourly billing totals exceeding $100,000 there could hot have been research time 
constraints. 
 209. A financially sophisticated taxpayer would likely discount the maximum exposure by the 
probability of the indemnity being called upon, similar to the analysis used by insurance companies 
to establish reserves. 
 210. Many business and financial transactions involving long-term commitments do not 
specify the assets that the party giving the commitment must maintain. 
38
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 27 [2012], Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol27/iss1/3
9- MOLDENHAUER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:24 PM 
2012] PENALTY PROTECTION OPINIONS 93 
quality work product.211  Second, the fee was not based on the time 
spent by the accounting firm on the transaction.212  Third, the fee was 
effectively payable only if the accounting firm was able to render the 
opinion.213 
On the first point, the court’s decision strongly implies that the only 
reason the accounting firm was willing to render an opinion at a 
“should” level was because it was receiving an $800,000 fee.  As the 
court put it:  “PWC crossed over the line from trusted adviser for prior 
accounting purposes to advocate for a position with no authority that 
was based on an opinion with a high price tag—$800,000.”214 
This characterization implies that the accounting firm engaged in 
high priced prostitution, but there is nothing in the court’s decision that 
convincingly establishes that the accounting firm did not believe the 
conclusions in its opinion.  The court appears to base its characterization 
primarily on the fact that when the advisor was asked how the 
accounting firm could issue a “should” opinion if no authority on point 
existed to support the position taken in the opinion, he “demurred that it 
was what Chesapeake requested.”215  From that response, the court 
extrapolated that “no lesser level of comfort would have commanded the 
$800,000 fixed fee that Chesapeake paid for the opinion.”216  However, 
a conclusion that the taxpayer would not have been willing to pay for a 
weaker opinion does not necessarily mean that the amount of the fee 
influenced the accounting firm’s belief in its opinion.217 
The court characterizes the second and third points as two sides of a 
metaphorical coin: 
 
 211. Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T. C. 199, 219 (2010) (noting the opinion, which was in draft 
form, was littered with typographical errors, disorganized and incomplete). 
 212. Id.  An $800,000 flat fee for the opinion was issued which was not based on time devoted 
to preparation of the opinion. 
 213. Id.  The flat fee was to be paid for the opinion, thus, in order to receive the fee, the 
opinion had to be completed. 
 214. Id. at 220.  See also Bemont Invs., LLC v. United States, Nos. 4:07cv9, 4:07cv10, 2010 
WL 3057437, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010) (“[t]he Court believes that Coscia was no more than 
a ‘puppet’ for Plaintiffs and rendered no real independent or objective advice. Coscia said what he 
was paid to say.”). 
 215. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 219. 
 216. Id. at 220. 
 217. The court notes that the opinion, which was in draft form, was littered with typographical 
errors, disorganized, and incomplete, and that the author of the opinion failed to recognize several 
parts of the opinion.  Those facts suggest a level of sloppiness that has no place in a top-tier 
accounting firm.  However, they do not in themselves suggest that the accounting firm did not 
believe the conclusions in the opinion. 
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We also find suspect the exorbitant price tag associated with the sole 
condition of closing.  Chesapeake essentially bought an insurance 
policy as to the taxability of the transaction.  PWC received an 
$800,000 fixed fee for its tax opinion.  PWC did not base its fee on an 
hourly rate plus expenses.  The fee was payable and contingent on the 
closing of the joint venture transaction.  PWC would receive payment 
only if it issued Chesapeake a “should” opinion on the joint venture 
transaction.  PWC therefore had a large stake in making sure the 
closing occurred. 
Considering all the facts and circumstances, PWC’s opinion looks 
more like a quid pro quo arrangement than a true tax advisory 
opinion.218 
This may have been the case, but there is another possible, and less 
venal, explanation of the billing arrangement that was not addressed by 
the court.219  As the court found, the taxpayer concluded that a taxable 
sale of the business would not be advantageous, and therefore engaged 
the investment bank and the accounting firm to develop “strategic 
alternatives” for the business.220  The investment bank recommended to 
the taxpayer’s management that the best alternative for maximizing 
shareholder value would be a leveraged partnership structure with the 
other party to the transaction.221  The taxpayer’s board liked the 
leveraged partnership idea, but the taxpayer made clear to the investment 
bank and to the accounting firm that it would only approve a nontaxable 
transaction.222  Moreover, the taxpayer made clear that it would only 
approve the transaction if the accounting firm rendered a “should” level 
opinion, presumably because the taxpayer wanted assurance that the 
transaction presented a low level of tax risk.223 
The taxpayer and the accounting firm also agreed to a billing 
arrangement under which the accounting firm would bill the taxpayer at 
the close of the transaction.224  Presumably, this condition was requested 
by the taxpayer, not the accounting firm, which took the risk that the 
 
 218. Id. at 221. 
 219. Some commentators have argued that the court’s conclusion that the accounting firm 
would be paid nothing if the transaction did not close was not supported by the record.  Lipton & 
Golub, supra note 186, at 352.  Based on personal experience, it seems doubtful that an accounting 
firm would agree to take the entire risk of working for nothing if the transaction does not close; 
however, the remaining discussion assumes that the court’s characterization of the fee arrangement 
is correct. 
 220. Canal Corp., 135 T.C. at 203. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 204. 
 223. Id. at 205. 
 224. Id. at 206. 
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transaction would not close for any number of possible reasons, such as 
the failure of the parties to reach a commercial agreement, the failure to 
receive antitrust clearances, etc.  For the taxpayer, the accounting firm’s 
work would be worthless unless the transaction closed, and the 
accounting firm was willing to accept the financial risk of its work being 
worthless.  The accounting firm recognized that its ability to render a 
“should” level opinion was one condition to the closing, but presumably 
the accounting firm had concluded that it would be able to render such 
an opinion.225  However, the accounting firm knew that the transaction 
would require a large amount of work,226 and wanted to receive a 
premium for taking the risk that the transaction would not close for 
reasons unrelated to its ability to render a “should” level opinion. 
Needless to say, it is impossible as outsiders to know exactly what 
went through the minds of the taxpayer and the accounting firm as they 
negotiated the billing arrangement.  However, given the severe reproach 
levied by the court, one would have hoped for it to first address more 
innocent explanations. 
Looking past the specific faults identified by the court, the Canal 
Corp. decision seems to reflect the view that a sophisticated taxpayer 
that arranges its affairs to take a knowingly aggressive position, and that 
pays a tax advisor to develop an opinion that supports the position, 
should not be entitled to rely on the opinion to avoid penalties.  
Knowing that the position is aggressive, the taxpayer already has 
accepted the possibility that taxes may not be avoided, and the opinion 
thus serves merely to shield the taxpayer from penalties.  Effectively, 
there is a range of possible legal conclusions regarding the taxpayer’s 
position, falling on either side of the line.  The advisor’s judgment that 
the position is more likely to be correct than incorrect should be 
discounted because the advisor is being paid to reach that conclusion.  
Under this view, a sophisticated taxpayer should not be able to rely on 
 
 225. As discussed above, the leveraged partnership tax deferral strategy was well known and 
accepted within the tax profession. 
 226. The court was skeptical of the tax advisor’s testimony that he and his team “spent hours 
on the opinion,” because the opinion was “littered with typographical errors, disorganized and 
incomplete.”  Id. at 219.  However, it is clear that the tax advisor and his team spent a large amount 
of time on the transaction as a whole.  As noted by the court, they helped the investment bank 
develop a recommended strategy, were “intricately involved in drafting the joint venture agreement, 
the operating agreement and the indemnity agreement,” reviewed the assets of the joint venture and 
the entity providing the indemnity, researched state law points, and researched and drafted the 
opinion.  Id. at 221.  In drafting the transaction documents, the tax advisor coordinated closely with 
the taxpayer’s management in considering the circumstances in which the taxpayer would be called 
upon to pay the indemnity. 
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an opinion to avoid penalties on a position the taxpayer has arranged to 
take unless objectively there is little likelihood that the position is 
incorrect.227 
There are two fundamental problems with this view.  First, it favors 
tax positions where the taxpayer has not altered its behavior in order to 
take the position.  Not only does this discourage candor on the part of 
taxpayers about their motivations, it is not clear that tax planning should 
be discouraged.  By enacting rules that tax certain behaviors less than 
others, Congress has effectively expressed a judgment that the lower-
taxed behaviors are socially desirable.228 
Second, the view effectively disqualifies a judgment by a tax 
advisor that under the regulations would be acceptable if made directly 
by the taxpayer.  All that the regulations require of a taxpayer making its 
own analysis is that its position have substantial authority and that it 
“reasonably conclude in good faith” that the position is more likely to be 
correct than incorrect based on the pertinent facts and authorities, and 
weighing the authorities based on their relevance, persuasiveness, and 
authoritativeness.229   Reasonableness and good faith do not require the 
taxpayer to avoid reporting a position unless there is a minimal level of 
risk that the position will be incorrect.  Rather, the reasonableness and 
good faith standard require the taxpayer to evaluate its position in a 
manner that is objectively reasonable, and to believe its analysis.230 
Obviously, the fact that the taxpayer has a self-interest in paying 
less tax does not disqualify its evaluation, because the regulations 
specifically contemplate that the taxpayer makes the evaluation.  
Accordingly, the regulations permit a taxpayer to take its own self-
interest into account in asserting a position that is barely more likely to 
be correct than to be incorrect.  However, the regulations do not permit 
the taxpayer to take its own interest into account in weighing the 
probability that the position is correct.231 
The standard should be no more stringent when the taxpayer pays a 
tax advisor to undertake the analysis.  The tax advisor has a financial 
interest in reaching a favorable conclusion where there is a range of 
 
 227. For a proposal along these lines, see Doran, supra note 11, at 154-56. 
 228. Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters:  The Problem, Possible 
Solutions, And a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 384-87 (2002). 
 229. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(A), (B)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
 230. See Bubel, supra note 11, at 832-35 (discussing the factors taken into account in 
evaluating good faith and reasonableness). 
 231. See Lawsky, supra note 11, at 1059 (“the government also wants the taxpayer to make a 
‘reasonable’ judgment–that is, it wants the taxpayer to judge and report her own chances of success 
in the same way that a non-self-interested person would judge and report those chances.”). 
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objectively reasonable outcomes, but that financial interest merely 
reflects the taxpayer’s own financial interest in paying less tax.  As 
discussed above, the taxpayer’s financial interest will be present any 
time that the taxpayer makes its own assessment of a position, and the 
regulations implicitly accept that fact, just as they implicitly accept the 
fact that a “professional tax advisor” will be paid by the taxpayer.232  
Given the training received by tax professionals and the professional 
standards to which they are subject, there is little reason to believe that 
tax advisors overall are more likely to skew their analysis than taxpayers 
with an equivalent level of tax sophistication.233 
It may be argued that sophisticated taxpayers engaging in 
aggressive tax planning should not be able to rely on opinions of paid 
advisors, because they will be able to find compliant advisors who 
approve positions that a reasonable analysis would indicate are less 
likely to be correct than incorrect.  That concern largely is addressed by 
the requirement that the taxpayer’s reliance on an opinion be reasonable 
and undertaken in good faith.  If the taxpayer itself has not undertaken 
an analysis of the position, the regulations do not ask the court to 
consider whether a reasonable taxpayer would reach the same position as 
the tax advisor, beyond the general requirement that the position not be 
“too good to be true.” 
IV.  DEVELOPING A METHOD FOR ANALYZING A TAX ADVISOR’S 
OBJECTIVENESS 
Ultimately, the goal of any method for evaluating potential 
conflicts of interest should be to illuminate the extent of the taxpayer’s 
efforts to assess its proper tax liability through reasonable reliance on a 
tax advisor’s opinion that is undertaken in good faith.  As the cases 
discussed above have demonstrated, it is possible for an advisor to have 
a conflict of interest but for a taxpayer to act reasonably and in good 
faith in relying on the advisor’s opinion.  Therefore, a per se rule is not 
appropriate.  Rather, it is necessary to develop a method for evaluating 
the reasonableness of the taxpayer’s belief that the opinion was reliable, 
and whether the taxpayer held that belief in good faith. 
A contrary view would assert the prophylactic benefit of a per se 
rule.  Under that view, a taxpayer should seek alternative advice if it is 
 
 232. See Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2009) (“one in need of 
legal advice almost always has to pay something for it.”). 
 233. As the cases discussed above demonstrate, examples of misconduct can be found on the 
part of both tax advisors and taxpayers.  That inevitably is the case in any large population. 
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aware of a conflict of interest, because that the taxpayer is not in a 
position to judge the merits of the conflicted tax advisor’s opinion.  
However, there are five principal problems with that argument.  First, 
conflicts of interest are inevitable whenever a paid tax advisor is 
involved.  Even in a strict paradigm where the taxpayer approaches the 
tax advisor to furnish a neutral view of the legitimacy of a structure, 
such as that proposed by the court in 106 Ltd., a paid preparer will have 
temptations to find the arguments that support the tax reduction potential 
of a structure.  As discussed above, the fact that an advisor is 
compensated by the taxpayer is implicit in the regulatory structure.   
Second, there is little basis to distinguish “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” conflicts of interest beyond platitudes and anecdotes.  
Consider, for example, the paradigm articulated in 106 Ltd.  Why should 
we believe that a tax advisor is significantly more likely to distort his 
advice merely because he has been engaged for the first time by the 
taxpayer, because he has alerted the client of the need for tax advice, 
because he has made factual inquiries outside his specific tax expertise, 
because his advice differs in some fashion from his typical practice, or 
because he charges a fee that is not based on his regular hourly rate?  
Even if these factors may have some association with aggressive tax 
planning, there are many situations where tax advisors have acted 
responsibly in the presence of one or more such factors.  Conversely, the 
cases above demonstrate that the potential for distorted advice exists 
even where, for example, the tax advisor has a long-term continual 
relationship with the taxpayer. 
Third, a paradigm such as that articulated in 106 Ltd. is unlikely to 
reflect the day-to-day relationships of many taxpayers and their tax 
advisors, and therefore become a trap for the unwary.  For example, 
many taxpayers lack a long-term and continual relationship with any tax 
advisor, and many others have a long-term and continual relationship 
only with a relatively unsophisticated tax return preparer.  Therefore, on 
complex matters, they either will be compelled to seek out a new tax 
advisor, or will be well advised to do so.  Likewise, many taxpayers rely 
on their tax advisors to alert them when tax advice is appropriate, or will 
seek out a tax advisor specifically to develop a strategy for reducing 
taxes.  Many taxpayers will encourage their tax advisors to make 
judgments that go beyond the technical tax rules but that may affect the 
tax analysis of a particular transaction.  Finally, many taxpayers find 
hourly billing arrangements undesirable because the fees are not 
connected to the taxpayer’s own business success or failure, and because 
the amount of time an advisor will spend often is difficult to control. 
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Fourth, the notion of a per se test is inconsistent with the analysis 
required under the relevant regulations.  The regulations do impose some 
conditions on the opinion that may be viewed as per se requirements:  
the advice must be based upon all pertinent facts and circumstances and 
the law as it relates to those facts and circumstances.  The advice must 
take into account the taxpayer’s purposes (and the relative weight of 
such purposes) for entering into a transaction and for structuring it in a 
particular manner.  The advice must not be based on unreasonable 
factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future events) 
and must not unreasonably rely on the representations, statements, 
findings, or agreements of the taxpayer or any other person.  In the case 
of a tax shelter item of a corporation, there must be substantial authority 
for the position, and the opinion must unambiguously state that the tax 
advisor concludes that there is a greater than 50% likelihood that the tax 
treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the IRS.  However, 
beyond those specific requirements, the regulation makes clear that “[a]ll 
facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining 
whether a taxpayer has reasonably relied in good faith on advice . . . 
.”234 
More generally, the regulations determine reasonableness and good 
faith from the perspective of the taxpayer, not the advisor.  Thus, for 
example, the regulations note that “the taxpayer’s education, 
sophistication and business experience will be relevant in determining 
whether the taxpayer’s reliance on tax advice was reasonable and made 
in good faith.”235  Likewise, in the case of a tax shelter item of a 
corporation, the “belief requirement” is satisfied only if, based on all 
facts and circumstances, “the corporation reasonably believed, at the 
time the return was filed, that the tax treatment of the item was more 
likely than not the proper treatment.”236  Consistent with that approach, 
the regulations frequently refer to facts that a taxpayer knew, or 
reasonably should have known.237  In other words, the purpose of the 
analysis is not to render judgment on the advisor’s behavior, but to 
 
 234. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. § 1.6664-4(f)(2)(i)(B). 
 237. See id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (“reliance may not be reasonable or in good faith if the taxpayer 
knew, or reasonably should have known, that the advisor lacked knowledge in the relevant aspects 
of Federal tax law”); Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (“the requirements of this paragraph (c)(1) are not 
satisfied if the taxpayer fails to disclose a fact that it knows, or reasonably should know, to be 
relevant to the proper tax treatment of an item”); Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii) (“the advice must not be 
based upon a representation or assumption which the taxpayer knows, or has reason to know, is 
unlikely to be true.”). 
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assess whether the taxpayer made a reasonable and good faith attempt to 
report its proper tax liability.238 
Finally, the presence of a statutory per se rule for reportable 
transaction understatement penalties strongly suggests that no such rule 
should exist for other types of understatement penalties.  As discussed 
above, section 6664(d)(4)(B) of the Code provides that an opinion of a 
tax advisor may not be relied upon to establish the reasonable belief of a 
taxpayer in respect of a reportable transaction if the tax advisor is a 
“disqualified tax advisor,”  which it defines as a tax advisor having 
certain types of involvement with the transaction, certain compensation 
arrangements, or certain financial interests with respect to the 
transaction.239  The legislative history to this provision clearly indicates 
that it imposed “more meaningful” and “strengthened” test compared to 
the general standard for reliance on opinions.240 
In the absence of a per se rule, an advisor’s conflict of interest must 
be evaluated as a fact and circumstance in determining whether the 
taxpayer has acted reasonably and in good faith.  It first is necessary to 
consider whether the conflict of interest is relevant to this determination.  
If so, it is necessary to consider what it reveals about the taxpayer’s 
efforts to determine its proper tax liability. 
A. Relevance of a Conflict of Interest 
Assume that a tax advisor has a large conflict of interest.  Are there 
circumstances where the taxpayer should be permitted to rely on what 
turns out to be an incorrect opinion from the tax advisor because the 
conflict is irrelevant? 
One possible circumstance is where the taxpayer is unaware of, and 
has no reason to know of, the tax advisor’s conflict of interest.  For 
example, assume that the tax shelter promoter learns of the identity of 
the tax advisor, who was independently selected by the taxpayer, and 
refers another client to the advisor with the hope of influencing the 
advisor’s analysis.  The advisor accepts the referral and fails to disclose 
it to the taxpayer.  One way of analyzing this situation is to ask whether 
 
 238. There are various other fora for determining for evaluating a tax advisor’s behavior, 
including, for example, disciplinary actions under Circular 230 by the Treasury Department Office 
of Professional Responsibility, State ethics proceedings, the imposition of tax return preparer 
penalties under I.R.C. § 6694, malpractice actions, and actions to enforce the securities laws.  See 
generally DAVID T. MOLDENHAUER, TAX OPINIONS IN LEGAL OPINION LETTERS, A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO OPINION LETTER PRACTICE (M. John Sterba ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
 239. See supra Part II. 
 240. H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, pt. 1, at 263 (2004). 
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the taxpayer or the government should bear any consequences of the tax 
advisor’s undisclosed conflict of interest, assuming that the opinion 
otherwise meets the regulatory requirements.  However, because the 
issue does not concern the taxpayer’s substantive tax liability, but rather 
the imposition of penalties, this type of “zero sum” analysis should not 
apply.  Rather, the issue should be determined based on the purpose of 
the reasonable cause and good faith exception, which looks to the 
taxpayer’s state of mind and behavior.  If the taxpayer has been vigilant 
in selecting and instructing the tax advisor, there is little reason to deny 
penalty relief because of the tax advisor’s own potential misbehavior. 
A second possible circumstance is where the conflicted tax advisor 
has rendered an opinion that demonstrably is equivalent to the opinion 
that would be rendered by a more independent advisor.  Imagine, for 
example, a case where the tax advisor promotes a common tax credit 
strategy in exchange for a portion of the tax savings, and where the 
relevant legal issue has been decided favorably to taxpayers by the 
relevant circuit court of appeals, but there is a split with another circuit 
court of appeals that decided adversely to taxpayers.  The taxpayer has 
made no separate analysis.  If the opinion is rendered and the tax return 
is filed before the Supreme Court grants certiorari to decide the circuit 
split, and if more independent advisors have rendered equivalent 
opinions, it would seem unfair to deny the taxpayer penalty relief 
because of the tax advisor’s posture as a marketer and implementer of 
the transaction, or because the tax advisor is paid a portion of the tax 
savings.  Given the low probability of the Supreme Court granting 
certiorari on any issue, there is little reason to impute to the tax advisor a 
willful blindness to the possibility that the circuit court of appeals 
decision could not be relied upon. 
Should a conflict be deemed irrelevant because the circumstances 
under which the conflict arose are not directly related to the flaw in the 
transaction?  For example, assume that a tax advisor develops a tax 
reduction strategy that would be effective if it were properly 
implemented, but for reasons unrelated to the tax advisor, and unknown 
to the tax advisor, the implementation is flawed.  If the test of relevance 
is whether the opinion demonstrably is equivalent to the opinion that 
would be rendered by a more independent advisor, the fact that the tax 
advisor is unconnected with the implementation may not be sufficient to 
ignore the conflict of interest.  For example, a more independent tax 
advisor might have reviewed more carefully the implementation of the 
strategy. 
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B. When a Conflict of Interest is Relevant 
In many situations, the conflict of interest will be relevant and the 
inquiry becomes what the conflict of interest reveals about the 
taxpayer’s efforts to determine its proper tax liability.  Two variables 
seem relevant for this analysis:  (1) the inducement that an apparent 
conflict may create to distort the advice (“temptation”),241 and (2) the 
advisor’s apparent response to such inducement (“resistance”). 
Applying those two variables creates a framework for analysis.  
Assuming the other requirements of the regulations are satisfied, a 
taxpayer can reasonably and in good faith rely on an opinion rendered by 
an advisor subject to a low level of apparent temptation, and who 
appears to act with a proper level of resistance.  Conversely, a taxpayer 
should not be permitted to rely on an opinion where there is a high level 
of apparent temptation, and little indication that the advisor is resisting 
the temptation to distort the advice in favor of tax reduction. 
The more interesting cases arise where either the level of apparent 
temptation is high, but the level of apparent resistance also is high, or 
where the level of apparent temptation is low, but the level of apparent 
resistance also is low.  Assume, for example, that in Canal Corp. the 
record showed that the taxpayer knew that the accounting firm’s opinion 
committee had approved the opinion after an intense review of the facts 
and applicable law, and that no member of that committee was aware of 
the billing arrangements.  In that case, the fact that the accounting firm 
had a financial incentive to render a favorable opinion, and that it 
arguably colluded in producing the facts on which it based the opinion, 
should not prevent the taxpayer from relying on the opinion.  To all 
appearances, the financial incentive had been resisted, and as discussed 
above, it is common for tax practitioners to participate in shaping 
business transactions to achieve legitimate tax reductions.  Under those 
facts, to deny the taxpayer the ability to rely on the opinion because of 
the accounting firm’s financial incentive and its involvement in the 
transaction would effectively apply an impermissible per se rule. 
Now assume that a taxpayer with no tax expertise asks its long-time 
advisor at a respected firm to review a tax shelter that the taxpayer was 
offered.  The firm has no relationship with the promoter, has not 
promoted similar strategies, and will be paid hourly rates for its review.  
The advisor inquires into the relevant facts, but does not participate in 
 
 241. As discussed above, if the temptation is not apparent, it is doubtful that the conflict of 
interest should be considered relevant in determining whether the taxpayer acted reasonably and in 
good faith in relying on the tax advisor’s opinion. 
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shaping the facts.  The opinion that the advisor renders accurately sets 
for the relevant facts and does not contain any unreasonable 
assumptions, because among other things it acknowledges the taxpayer’s 
primary motivation to reduce taxes.  The taxpayer and the advisor have a 
friendly relationship, and when the taxpayer first approaches the advisor 
and describes the shelter, the advisor says “I think I can get there.”  The 
advisor spends a considerable amount of time developing an opinion that 
describes all the facts and issues, but relies on minor factual distinctions 
and outdated and marginal cases to reach a favorable conclusion.  The 
advisor knows—but does not tell the taxpayer—that the transaction is 
unlikely to be sustained, but he figures the chances of audit are low. 
In this example, the level of apparent temptation is low, specifically 
the advisor’s personal desire to accommodate the taxpayer, and 
presumably to receive future work.  However, certain facts in retrospect 
indicate that the advisor was not resisting the temptation.  Specifically, 
the advisor’s quick response that he thought he could “get there,” and his 
considerable effort to do so.  A court reviewing the opinion will quickly 
recognize its flaws; however, as the Supreme Court recognized in Boyle, 
the taxpayer is not competent to discern those flaws.242  For the same 
reason, it seems inappropriate to expect the taxpayer to second-guess 
either the fact that the advisor was quick to indicate that he could reach a 
favorable result, or the fact that he spent substantial time to do what he 
quickly said he could do.  Although the taxpayer may realize that the 
issue is more difficult than it first appeared to the advisor, ultimately the 
advisor stands in a position of apparent authority vis à vis the taxpayer.  
As the Supreme Court stated in Boyle, “[t]o require the taxpayer to 
challenge the attorney, to seek a ‘second opinion,’ or to try to monitor 
counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very 
purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place.”243 
One can imagine other cases where the advisor more obviously 
succumbs to a low level of temptation.  Imagine, for example, that in the 
initial conversation the advisor says “I normally wouldn’t do this, but I 
think I can get there for you.”  At that point, the taxpayer reasonably 
 
 242. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985). 
 243. Id.; see also Bubel, supra note 11, at 846: 
[r]easonable reliance does not require a taxpayer to monitor and second-guess the efforts 
of the practitioners on whom she is relying with respect to an area of the tax law that is 
beyond her understanding.  Rather, the taxpayer is expected to exercise ‘ordinary 
business care and prudence’ in selecting a [sic] an advisor with sufficient expertise to 
justify reliance (and in seeing to it that the advisor is provided with adequate 
information). 
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should inquire further, and if the statement is what it appears to be, 
should decline the offer. 
Needless to say, between these four poles (high temptation and high 
resistance, high temptation and low resistance, low temptation and high 
resistance, and low temptation and low resistance), there is an infinite 
number of potential intermediate positions.  However, identifying the 
factors that create apparent temptation for a tax advisor to skew his 
advice, and evaluating the advisor’s apparent resistance to that 
temptation, creates a framework for courts to consider whether a 
taxpayer should have been skeptical of the advice. 
C. Forms of Temptation 
In considering how the foregoing framework might apply, it is 
useful to identify some common forms of temptation that tax advisors 
have faced when advising on tax-motivated transactions.  In the cases 
discussed above, the tax advisors appear to have been motivated by the 
following types of temptations: 
• An opportunity to earn a large fee without necessarily spending a 
corresponding amount of working hours; 
• An opportunity to build or maintain a practice and a track record; 
• An opportunity to deepen ties to the taxpayer as client and 
exclude competitors; 
• An opportunity to handle a challenging transaction and to 
successfully develop or implement a way to reduce taxes. 
These types of temptations can appear in some fashion in any 
sophisticated transaction, and pursuing these temptations is not in itself 
illegitimate.  Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the circumstances 
when an advisor’s response to those temptations can make an opinion 
unreliable. 
1. Compensation and Hours Worked 
Courts generally have viewed compensation based on a percentage 
of tax benefits generated by a transaction as a strong indicator that an 
advisor’s opinion is unreliable.244  Also, some courts have viewed high 
 
 244. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1382 (2010) (“J&G’s 
role as a promoter of the strategy was . . . apparent in J&G’s fee agreement, which tied the firm’s 
compensation to the gain sheltered by the strategy”); Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 
482 (7th Cir. 2009) (“when an adviser profits considerably from his participation in the tax shelter, 
such as where he is compensated through a percentage of the taxes actually sheltered, a taxpayer is 
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levels of compensation that are not based on the number of hours 
worked as indicating that an opinion is unreliable.245  The rationale is 
that a tax advisor who is being paid a premium for delivering a tax 
strategy is more likely to skew the advice in favor of its success. 
The fact that a tax advisor charges a premium over rates charged 
for other work may be compensation for the tax reduction idea, for other 
value that the tax advisor provides (e.g., successfully negotiating a 
difficult commercial transaction, advising under very difficult 
circumstances, or giving up other profitable opportunities), or because 
the tax advisor incurs some risk.  Among the risks that a tax advisor 
might consider himself to incur are the professional risks of delivering 
an opinion that is “at the edge,” or commercial risks such as discounted 
arrangements for his work if the transaction is unsuccessful. 
If the compensation arrangements indicate that the advisor is 
receiving a premium for a tax reduction idea, or for taking the risk of 
providing an opinion “at the edge,” further analysis is clearly merited.  
The very fact that an advisor is charging a premium based on the tax 
reduction offered by the strategy is behavior by the advisor that reflects a 
motivation for the premium.  The argument for imputing unreliability is 
that having shown a desire for the premium, it is reasonable to expect 
 
much less reasonable in relying on any advice the adviser may provide”); Murfam Farms, LLC ex. 
rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247 (2010): 
[t]he Murphys have conceded that from the beginning they understood that E&Y’s fee 
would be a percentage of their desired tax loss. . .  In other words, the Murphys 
understood that the more taxes they avoided by following E&Y’s advice the more they 
would pay E&Y in fees.  The Murphys knew that E&Y stood to earn millions by 
advising them to participate in COBRA, and they therefore knew or should have known 
that E&Y’s advice lacked the trustworthiness of an impartial opinion 
New Phoenix Sunrise v.Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 194 (2009) (“Petitioner should have . . . known that 
Jenkins & Gilchrist had a personal stake in the BLISS transaction and could not be relied upon to 
provide independent advice.”). 
 245. 106 Ltd. v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 67, 80-81 (2011): 
Garza charged a flat fee for implementing [the tax shelter] and wouldn’t have been 
compensated at all if Palmlund decided not to go through with it.  He wasn’t being paid 
to evaluate the deal or tweak a real business deal to increase its tax advantages; he was 
being paid to make it happen.  And Turner & Stone charged $8,000 for preparing 
Palmlund’s tax returns–$6,500 more than usual.  The extra fees were not attributable to 
an extraordinarily complex return–Palmlund’s returns were always complex due to his 
various business interests–but, we find, were the firm’s cut for helping to make the deal 
happen 
Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199, 221 (2010) (“[w]e also find suspect the exorbitant price tag 
associated with the sole condition of closing.  Chesapeake essentially bought an insurance policy as 
to the taxability of the transaction.  PWC received an $800,000 fixed fee for its tax opinion.  PWC 
did not base its fee on an hourly rate plus expenses.”). 
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that the advisor will skew his advice in order to get it.246  However, that 
argument confuses the temptation and the resistance—it essentially 
assumes that tax professionals are willing to alter their analysis in 
response to financial inducement. 
One fundamental problem with this position is any professional tax 
advisor who is structuring a transaction is being paid for his tax 
structuring ideas, regardless of the form of compensation.  Even at 
hourly rates, a tax advisor is induced to provide advice, and as many 
leading tax advisors would be quick to point out, their high hourly rates 
are based on the intellectual content (i.e., tax saving ideas) they are able 
to provide.  As the court in American Boat noted, “one in need of legal 
advice almost always has to pay something for it.”247 
Because advice cannot be viewed as unreliable merely because an 
advisor receives compensation, an approach that treats a specific 
compensation formula as suspect must be based on the grounds that the 
formula will cause the tax advisor to alter his views.  There are two 
possible justifications for this position, although neither holds up well to 
probing.  One possible justification is that an advisor who receives a 
premium for a tax idea, rather than charging his regular hourly rate, is 
being paid because he is able to deliver an idea that other tax advisors 
who are compensated by the hour are unable or unwilling to provide.  
The premise is that if other, hourly rate, tax advisors are unable or 
unwilling to provide the advice, the tax idea itself must be viewed as 
suspect. 
The problem with this premise is that the tax profession attracts 
intelligent people who sometimes have insights that elude others.  One 
frequently hears in the profession references to the brilliance of one or 
another tax advisor.  There will be circumstances where a sophisticated 
taxpayer should recognize that the analysis is faulty or “too good to be 
true,” but often the taxpayer is not in a position to determine whether the 
substantive advice reflects brilliance or wishful thinking.  One might 
argue that a taxpayer paying a higher than normal price for a tax idea 
should obtain a second opinion to verify the idea.  However, if the two 
advisors disagree, the taxpayer is in no position to determine which 
advisor is correct.  One might further argue that the taxpayer should 
discount the position of the advisor receiving the premium, but that begs 
the question. 
 
 246. See, e.g., Am. Boat, 583 F.3d at 485 (“[h]ad Mayer required his compensation to be a 
percentage of the sheltered capital gains, perhaps our analysis would be different.”). 
 247. Id. at 483. 
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The second possible justification is that a premium payment 
implicitly depends on the advisor’s ability to render favorable advice to 
the taxpayer.  The premium thus creates a temptation to skew the advice.  
However, the existence of the temptation itself says nothing about how 
the advisor has responded to it.  Also, this justification requires two 
further assumptions:  first, the court must assume that an advisor who 
charges hourly rates would be paid the same amount (and would not, for 
example, provide a discount) if the advisor were unable to provide 
favorable advice.  Second, the court must assume that a hypothetical 
hourly rate advisor who could not resolve the issue favorably to the 
client would command the same hourly rate as a hypothetical hourly rate 
advisor who would resolve the issue favorably.  It is difficult to imagine 
how these assumptions could be tested. 
In most cases, courts do not need to rely solely on the fee structure 
to establish a conflict of interest, because the advisors take other actions 
to enhance their chances of deriving the premium.  One obvious example 
is where the tax advisor markets the strategy, thereby creating the 
opportunity for himself to benefit from providing the tax strategy.  
Because the advisor has affirmatively sought out this opportunity, and 
persuaded the taxpayer to use the strategy, his behavior clearly was 
influenced by the temptation.  There should be a very high hurdle to 
clear to establish that the advisor reasonably should not be suspected of 
also skewing his advice. 
Another example is where the tax advisor takes on disproportionate 
risks to ensure that the transaction occurs, for example the lawyer in 106 
Ltd., who personally promised to cover any taxes, penalties, or litigation 
costs of the taxpayer if the transaction blew up.248  A court might find 
evidence of such disproportionate risk-taking where an advisor agrees to 
be paid only on the closing of the transaction.  However, that conclusion 
assumes that advisor’s contingent fee arrangement helps ensure that the 
transaction occurs, and is not simply motivated by market pressures. 
A third example is where the advisor constructs unreal facts or 
makes unreal assumptions to support his opinion.  The choice to take 
those actions clearly indicates both the desire to have the transaction 
occur, and the willingness to apply wishful thinking to get there. 
 
 
 248. Under current law, that arrangement would cause the transaction to be a reportable 
transaction and under the more stringent rules of I.R.C. § 6664(d), the taxpayer would not be 
permitted to rely on the opinion to establish reasonable cause and good faith.  See supra note 50.50 
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2. Developing, Maintaining, and Protecting a Professional 
Practice 
In most of the cases discussed above, the tax advisor had prior 
involvement with the tax shelter, and presumably had derived fees from 
that involvement.  Those fees normally would be used to cover the 
operating expenses of the practice, including compensating personnel, 
and the remainder would be a profit to the owners of the practice.  One 
can assume that like in any business, there would have been a desire to 
maintain or grow the fees of the practice to continue covering expenses 
and generating a profit.  Also, given the intellectual effort involved in 
developing a tax strategy, it is likely that the tax advisor would have 
sought to reuse the knowledge and experience gained in prior 
transactions.249  The tax advisor would have had an interest in reaching 
similar conclusions to those reached in the prior transactions, in order to 
continue his practice of implementing the tax shelter, and to avoid 
having to explain any change in position.  Finally, the tax advisor would 
have an interest in limiting the risk that he or his firm may be held 
responsible if the transactions were challenged by the IRS. 
Courts generally have not treated an opinion as unreliable merely 
because the tax advisor previously advised on a similar product as 
opposed, for example, to having developed or marketed the tax shelter.  
However, in certain circumstances, courts have considered whether the 
tax advisor’s firm prepared and framed its advice in a manner intended 
to protect the firm’s reputation and franchise.250  The implication seems 
to be that if the tax advisor equivocates, qualifies his advice, or takes 
other actions to avoid legal or moral responsibility in the event that the 
transaction is challenged by the IRS, the taxpayer should view the advice 
as suspect and, presumably, seek advice from another advisor. 
In some cases, the behavior of the tax advisor will raise obvious 
questions.  For example, in Stobie Creek the taxpayers might have asked 
 
 249. If the tax advisor requires the taxpayer to maintain the confidentiality of the advisor’s tax 
strategies and the advisor’s fee exceeds certain thresholds, the transaction generally will be a 
reportable transaction.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3) (as amended in 2003).  In that case, the more 
stringent rules of I.R.C. § 6664(d) will prevent the taxpayer from relying on the advisor’s opinion to 
establish reasonable cause and good faith.  In addition, regardless of the amount of fees charged, the 
opinion will be subject to the standards of Circular 230 § 10.35 discussed above. 
 250. See, e.g., Murfam Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 250-52 
(2010) (describing accounting firm’s internal response to an IRS Notice that challenged the relevant 
tax shelter, and communications from the accounting firm to the clients regarding such notice); 
Stobie Creek Invs. LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 713 (2008), aff’d 608 F.3d 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (noting lawyer’s attempt to distance himself from his prior recommendation of a tax 
shelter transaction). 
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whether the law firm had second thoughts about the transaction when it 
volunteered to substantially reduce its fee or make an equivalent 
charitable contribution.251  However, in practice, a taxpayer may have 
difficulty determining whether disclaimers of legal liability, 
qualifications to the advice, or equivocations are a normal part of the 
advisor’s practice or reflect an advisor’s lack of confidence in the 
opinion.  The courts themselves have recognized the fact that in 
selecting a tax advisor, a taxpayer may rely largely on the tax advisor’s 
market reputation,252 and therefore may have little basis to evaluate the 
manner and terms on which the advice is being delivered.  More 
generally, the uncertain outcome of many tax issues, and the litigious 
nature of modern society naturally encourage tax advisors, like other 
professional advisors, to seek to protect themselves from legal liability 
by qualifying their advice. 
3. Cementing Relationships with Clients 
In several of the cases, the taxpayer was introduced to the tax 
shelter by lawyers or accountants with whom the taxpayer had long-
standing relationships.  In Stobie Creek and New Phoenix Sunrise, the 
lawyers handling a sale of the taxpayer’s business introduced the 
taxpayers to the tax shelter promoters.  In American Boat, the lawyer 
introduced a tax shelter into a business restructuring without the 
taxpayer fully understanding the nature of the transaction.  Presumably, 
the lawyers and accountants in those cases believed that providing good 
service to their clients included identifying opportunities to reduce the 
clients’ taxes.   
These cases demonstrate that a long-standing relationship between 
the taxpayer and the tax advisor does not guarantee that the client will 
receive reliable advice.  As previously discussed, it may be particularly 
difficult for a taxpayer that has a long-standing relationship with a tax 
 
 251. The unfortunate truth, in that case and in others, is that the taxpayers were more 
enthusiastic about the tax shelter than the advisors. 
 252. See, e.g., Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[t]urning 
back to 1996, when the Son of BOSS was still in its infancy and before all of the publicity and legal 
trouble, Erwin Mayer was a reputable attorney at Altheimer & Gray”); Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 
715 (“[t]he premier legal reputation of SLK is well established . . . Also, prior to the events leading 
to its public disgrace and dissolution of the law firm, and during the relevant time period, J&G 
enjoyed a vaunted reputation in legal and tax matters”); Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United 
States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that “Nix and Patterson knew that 
Hrdlicka was from one of the premier tax firms in the South.”). 
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advisor to ascertain when the tax advisor is proposing inappropriate 
strategies for the purpose of expanding the relationship. 
Conversely, there is little rationale for treating the opinions of tax 
advisors with whom a taxpayer does not have a long-standing 
relationship as inherently unreliable.  The apparent justification for that 
suggestion is that a tax advisor who provides template opinions for tax 
shelters will have only a brief relationship with the taxpayer.  However, 
as discussed above, there are legitimate reasons why a taxpayer may turn 
to a new or specialized tax advisor.  Therefore, it is doubtful that a tax 
advisor’s manifest desire to create or cement relationships with a 
taxpayer can itself be a ground for disqualifying an opinion absent a 
specific indication that the tax advisor is willing to provide distorted 
advice to achieve that goal. 
4. Challenging Transactions 
Tax advisors providing opinions on tax shelters typically are highly 
trained professionals who pride themselves in their ability to maneuver 
the rules and principles of the tax law to achieve advantages for their 
clients.  Given that orientation, tax advisors generally will muster all the 
available arguments in favor of tax reduction, and may have a bias 
against contrary arguments.253  A good illustration of this tendency is the 
internal memorandum prepared by the SLK tax lawyers that attempted to 
distinguish the tax shelter in Stobie Creek from the transactions 
described in the IRS notice, and the J&G tax partner’s views (and 
apparently those of the J&G opinion committee) along the same lines. 
Courts have approached that perceived bias in a number of ways.  
One way is to consider the nature of the transaction on which the tax 
professional is providing advice.  A number of courts and commentators 
have suggested that a tax opinion may be less reliable when the 
transaction is being undertaken solely for tax purposes.254  Presumably, 
the rationale is that where tax reduction is the only goal, and where a 
 
 253. See Lawsky, supra note 11, at 1062-63 (noting that experts making forecasts are often 
overconfident and identifying factors that may lead to overconfidence). 
 254. See also Bubel, supra note 11, at 878-79 (“penalty protection was probably never meant 
to extend to opinions given on cleverly engineered, structured transactions that would not have been 
undertaken at all but for the opinion itself . . . there is a significant difference between a structure in 
search of a transaction to effect a legitimate business end and a transaction in search of a willing 
structure”); David P. Harriton, Response to “Old ‘Brine’ in New Bottles” (New Brine in Old 
Bottles), 55 TAX L. REV. 397, 400 (2002) (“I therefore would limit any definition of ‘tax shelter’ 
that triggers higher penalties to transactions that, considered as a whole, would not have been 
entered into at all but for the desire to claim tax benefits.”).  See generally supra note 189. 
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transaction cannot be completed without a favorable opinion, a tax 
advisor is more likely to skew his estimate of the likelihood that the 
position is correct. 
There are two problems with this approach.  First, there is an 
implicit assumption that transactions with an explicit objective of 
reducing taxes are more likely to be faulty than transactions where the 
transaction has a separate business purpose and the tax planning involves 
the manner for effecting the transaction.  Although there have been 
many faulty tax shelters having tax avoidance as their only objective, 
there also are examples of legitimate transactions where the primary 
motivation of a participant is reducing taxes, including traditional 
leveraged lease transactions and tax credit transactions,255 as well as 
more original transactions that have been upheld by the courts.256  
Conversely, many highly abusive transactions have been constructed as 
real business transactions “done in a ‘funny’ way designed to achieve 
tax benefits clearly unintended by Congress.”257 
Second, the distinction between a transaction that is undertaken 
solely for tax purposes and tax planning connected with a legitimate 
business transaction assumes that the tax planning for a legitimate 
business transaction is ancillary and that favorable tax advice is not 
necessary to complete the transaction.  However, as illustrated by the 
Canal Corp. case, the tax costs of a legitimate business transaction may 
determine its viability, in which case the pressure on a tax advisor in 
such a transaction may be as great as in a purely tax motivated 
transaction. 
A second approach by courts to perceived advisor bias is to 
examine the substance of the tax advisor’s opinion.  In some cases, the 
courts have simply concluded that the results set forth in the tax opinion 
are “too good to be true.”258  In other cases, the courts have concluded 
 
 255. See, e.g., Harriton, supra note 254, at 402 (safe harbor leases and leveraged leases pass 
“legitimate tax benefits that have been conferred by Congress for investment in U.S. business 
property from one taxpayer to another”); Schler, supra note 228, at 329 (not all transactions having 
a principal purpose of tax avoidance are tax shelters). 
 256. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) (shifting of 
foreign tax credits and generating capital losses); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 
(8th Cir. 2001) (same); United Parcel Serv. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (generating 
deductions for insurance premiums paid to a foreign affiliate). 
 257. Schler, supra note 228, at 337.  See also Eustice, supra note 188, at 168-72 (discussing 
“intermediary transactions tax shelter.”). 
 258. See, e.g., Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
aff’g 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 714-15 (2008): 
[b]ased on Jeffrey Welles’s education and experience, as well as the reason the Welleses 
pursued the J&G strategy, the trial court found that Jeffrey Welles should have known 
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that opinions were unreliable because they failed to address issues or 
addressed them inaccurately.259  Finally, in some cases the courts have 
 
that the J&G strategy was ‘too good to be true.’ . . . In [his role as manager of the 
family’s complex finances,] he had helped implement a number of sophisticated tax-
planning strategies, giving him sufficient knowledge and experience to know when a tax 
planning strategy was likely ‘too good to be true’ 
Murfam Farms, LLC ex. rel. Murphy v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 235, 247 (2010) (“[p]ersons of 
their background would have known that sheltering nearly the exact amount of capital gains that 
they received from the Smithfield merger, in a barely comprehensible, complicated, transaction, in 
which there was no real chance of profit, was ‘too good to be true’”); Alpha I, L.P. v. United States, 
93 Fed. Cl. 280, 317 (2010) (“[e]ven if the taxpayer relied on advice of professionals, the taxpayer 
will still be liable for a negligence penalty if the purported savings are too good to be true”); Jade 
Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 56 (2007) (“[t]he spread transaction contributed to 
Jade was structured to yield and did yield tax benefits which Bergmann should have recognized as 
being ‘too good to be true’”); New Phoenix Sunrise v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 161, 195 (2009): 
Jenkens & Gilchrist’s conflict of interest and petitioner’s knowledge of recent 
developments in tax law should have convinced petitioner of the need for further 
investigation into the proper reporting of the BLISS transaction.  Petitioner claimed a 
fictional loss of nearly $11 million.  This is exactly the type of ‘too good to be true’ 
transaction that should cause taxpayers to seek out competent advice from independent 
advisers 
Kerman v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1241 (2011) (“[a]s a capable businessman and prudent 
investor, Mr. Kerman knew or should have known that the CARDS transaction was just too good to 
be true”); Robucci v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1060: 
[e]ven if we were to agree with petitioner that Mr. Carson was not a promoter, we agree 
with respondent that the tax result afforded by implementing Mr. Carson’s suggestions, 
i.e., the dramatic reduction in Dr. Robucci’s self-employment taxes, was ‘too good to be 
true’. . . . [In light of the lack of meaningful activities of the relevant entities], it was 
incumbent upon Dr. Robucci, even though he was not a tax professional, to question the 
efficacy of the arrangement that purported to minimize his taxes while effecting virtually 
no change in the conduct of his medical practice 
Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v. Comm’r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (2005) (In light of the fact that the 
relevant transactions lacked economic substance, “we believe that a reasonable and prudent person 
would recognize that these tax losses were ‘too good to be true’, especially given that neither SMP, 
Corona, Somerville S Trust, nor Imperial bore the economic loss associated with these tax losses.”).  
See also Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[w]hen, as here, 
a taxpayer is presented with what would appear to be a fabulous opportunity to avoid tax 
obligations, he should recognize that he proceeds at his own peril”); Bubel, supra note 11, at 854-55 
(discussing courts’ assessment of a taxpayer’s sophistication in determining whether the taxpayer 
relied reasonably and in good faith on a tax advisor’s opinion). 
 259. See, e.g., Bemont Invs., LLC v. United States, Nos. 4:07cv9, 4:07cv10, 2010 WL 
3057437, at *11 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2010) (“Coscia did little independent research into the question 
as to whether the investment vehicle would pass the IRS ‘sniff test.’  Much of his ‘work’ was cut 
and paste from prior opinions used by other tax shelter advocates”); Long Term Capital Holdings v. 
United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 209-11 (finding tax opinion unreliable in part because legal 
analysis on various issues was shallow and general, rather than specific to the facts of the taxpayer’s 
transactions, and failed to consider relevant case law); Canal Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 199, 220 
(2010) (tax opinion could not be relied upon because conclusions were based on reasoning by 
analogy and on unsupported conclusions drawn from a regulation); Santa Monica Pictures, 89 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1157 (finding various tax memoranda and opinions unreliable in part because of 
faulty conclusions or incomplete analysis).  But see Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 
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found that contemporaneous IRS announcements calling into question 
similar tax strategies placed the taxpayers on notice that the opinion was 
unreliable.260 
Each of those approaches implies an obligation on the part of the 
taxpayer to question the substantive merits of the tax advisor’s opinion.  
Arguably, these approaches can be justified by the per se requirements 
in the regulations that the advice be based on all pertinent facts and 
circumstances “and the law as it relates to those facts and 
circumstances.”261  In effect, if the opinion reaches an incorrect 
conclusion, it is not based on the applicable law. 
 
150 Fed. Appx. 40, 43 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005), aff’g 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 210 (D. Conn. 2004) 
(concluding that the inadequate legal analysis demonstrated that the opinion was based on “flawed 
and outcome-determinative assumptions Long-Term asked it to make.”). 
 260. See, e.g., Murfam Farms, 94 Fed. Cl. at 249, 251: 
Murfam’s supposed naivete regarding COBRA cannot be justified in light of all the other 
warning signs that the partners knew or had reason to know about.  By the time the tax 
returns were filed, there had been numerous unmistakable indications that COBRA was 
not legitimate.  For example, shortly before the Murphys received and signed their 
COBRA engagement letters, the IRS had issued Notice 99-59, warning taxpayers that 
artificial losses were not properly allowable. . . . According to Ezzell, he asked pointedly 
whether COBRA was subject to this ruling, Slagle replied that it was not, and that 
assurance was good enough for Ezzell. . . . Despite his previous background as a 
professional tax preparer, Ezzell insists that he did not think it was important to read 
Notice 99-59 himself. . . . In fact, Ezzell maintains that to this day he has never seen 
Notice 99-59. . . . If it is true that Ezzell never felt the need to read Notice 99-59 and to 
make his own determination as to its implications, that is not at all indicative of a good 
faith effort to assess one’s proper tax liability. . . . Even after February 2000, glaring 
warning signs that COBRA was abusive continued to appear.  On August 11, 2000, the 
IRS announced and, on August 13, 2000, the IRS released Notice 2000-44 
New Phoenix Sunrise, 132 T.C. at 192, 194: 
[a]t the time petitioner reported the BLISS transaction on its return, New Phoenix and its 
advisers knew that reliance on Helmer was misplaced.  New Phoenix filed its return well 
after the IRS issued Notice 2000-44, supra, was aware of recent developments in this 
area of tax law, and did not seek independent advice to guarantee proper reporting of the 
BLISS transaction. . . . At the time New Phoenix and its advisers were considering the 
proper reporting of the transaction, Mr. Litt and Mr. Wray were aware that the 
Government was investigating transactions similar to the transaction at issue.  These 
concerns should have put New Phoenix on notice that the reporting of the BLISS 
transaction as recommended by Jenkens & Gilchrist was unacceptable 
Palm Canyon X Inv. v. Comm’r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574 (2009) (“Palm Canyon received ample 
warning that respondent was not likely to respect its tax treatment of the MLD transaction.  On 
September 5, 2000, more than a year before the MLD transaction occurred, the IRS published 
Notice 2000-44”); CMA Consol. v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-16 (“given petitioner’s experience 
and expertise arranging lease strip deals and its awareness of Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334, 
petitioner was aware and forewarned but chose to proceed with the transactions and claim the 
deductions.”). 
 261. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 2003).  As discussed above, some courts 
have rejected opinions containing erroneous or incomplete analysis on the ground that they contain 
faulty “legal assumption.”  See supra note 204.  That characterization appears improper in cases 
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The regulations cannot reasonably be read in this way because a 
taxpayer will attempt to rely on an opinion to avoid penalties only in 
circumstances where the taxpayer has taken an incorrect position on its 
tax return.262  A requirement that the opinion contain a complete and 
correct legal analysis would be inconsistent with the basic factual 
premise that the taxpayer has taken an incorrect position.  Because “the 
most important factor” in determining whether a taxpayer has acted with 
reasonable cause and in good faith is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort 
to assess the taxpayer’s proper tax liability,263 omissions or inaccuracies 
in the legal analysis should only disqualify an opinion if the taxpayer 
knew or reasonably should have known under the circumstances that the 
opinion contains faulty legal analysis.264  The opposite conclusion 
effectively confuses the role of the disciplinary and malpractice 
standards applicable to tax advisors with the role of the reliance 
standards applicable to taxpayers.265   
Moreover, in determining whether the taxpayer knew or reasonably 
should have known that the opinion contains faulty legal analysis, courts 
should adhere to the Supreme Court’s dictum in Boyle.266  Provided that 
the taxpayer has made the appropriate inquiries under the circumstances, 
 
where an opinion has considered relevant or analogous authorities but reaches an incorrect 
conclusion. 
 262. See Prescott, supra note 8, at 1002 (“[o]bviously, the opinion does not have to be correct 
for a taxpayer to reasonably rely on it because the only time a taxpayer needs to show reasonable 
reliance is when the IRS or a court has determined that the opinion was incorrect and the IRS has 
imposed a penalty on the taxpayer.”). 
 263. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
 264. See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 150 Fed. Appx. 40, 43 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2005), aff’g 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 210 (D. Conn. 2004) (District Court did not “fault Long-Term for 
failing to detect legal deficiencies in the tax advice it received from K&S” and did not “[expect] 
Long-Term to engage in sophisticated questioning of its expert’s advice”); Prescott, supra note 8, at 
1023 (“it appears that, prior to Long Term Capital Holdings, courts did not deny penalty protection 
to a taxpayer simply because the quality of the legal advice provided to the taxpayer by a tax expert 
was inadequate or wrong.”). 
 265. But see Bubel, supra note 11, at 873 (arguing that an opinion that fails to address 
applicable authorities with sufficient objectivity and in sufficient depth to give the taxpayer a 
realistic picture of the tax law treatment of its position would violate the proscription in Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii) against unreasonable legal assumptions, and also violate various provisions of 
Circular 230 prescribing disciplinary standards for practitioners). 
 266. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985): 
[w]hen an accountant or attorney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as 
whether a liability exists, it is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice.  Most 
taxpayers are not competent to discern error in the substantive advice of an accountant or 
attorney.  To require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney, to seek a ‘second opinion,’ 
or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code himself would nullify the very 
purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place. . . . ‘Ordinary 
business care and prudence’ does not demand such actions. 
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and made use of its own knowledge and experience, the taxpayer should 
not be imputed tax expertise it does not in fact have.  As discussed 
above, a typical taxpayer will not be in a position to evaluate the tax 
advisor’s legal conclusions, absent a second opinion.267  Even if the 
taxpayer were to obtain a second opinion and the two advisors were to 
disagree, the taxpayer is in no position to determine which advisor is 
correct.  As one commentator has noted in respect of the District Court’s 
opinion in Long Term Capital Holdings:  
[T]he court’s standard would force a taxpayer who desires penalty 
protection to become a prognosticating tax expert who can anticipate 
whether the court will find his or her attorney’s advice sufficiently well 
grounded in the applicable law.  Clearly, that standard places too high 
a burden on taxpayers and could make tax counsel’s advice practically 
useless in the very transactions where penalty protection might be 
necessary.268 
On the other hand, the regulations do recognize that the receipt of a 
tax opinion meeting the specific regulatory requirements may not be 
dispositive if, depending on the circumstances, “the taxpayer claimed tax 
benefits that are unreasonable in comparison to the taxpayer’s 
investment in the tax shelter.”269  The emphasis in the regulation to the 
relevant facts and circumstances, and the reference in the regulations to 
the taxpayer’s “education, sophistication and business experience”270 
strongly suggests that the analysis should be framed from the perspective 
of the taxpayer.  In other words, the question is whether the specific 
taxpayer should have known that the purported tax benefits are 
implausible, and the taxpayer’s efforts to test any doubts. 
It follows from the foregoing that a court should not reject a 
taxpayer’s reliance on a tax opinion merely because the court finds the 
tax benefits stated in the opinion to be objectively implausible, or 
because the tax benefits are inconsistent with IRS pronouncements.  
Rather, the first should consider whether the specific taxpayer under the 
relevant facts and circumstances should have had reason to doubt the 
plausibility of the tax benefits, either because they were outsized, or 
 
 267. See NPR Invs., LLC v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 2d 676, 693 (2010) (“[a]s aptly stated 
by Mr. Nix at trial, ‘at every step, we followed the advice of people we relied on, people who were 
supposed to have known what they were doing and did know what they were doing.  And what else 
could we have done except follow their advice?’”).  As discussed above, in the specific facts of that 
case the taxpayer’s protestations do not come across as being particularly sincere. 
 268. See Prescott, supra note 8, at 126 (footnote omitted). 
 269. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(3) (as amended in 2003). 
 270. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1). 
61
Moldenhauer: Penalty Protection Opinions and Advisor Conflicts of Interest
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
9- MOLDENHAUER_MACRO FINAL.DOCM 4/11/2012  1:24 PM 
116 AKRON TAX JOURNAL [27:55 
because the taxpayer knew or should have known of the IRS’ position 
and its relationship to the taxpayer’s transaction.  The implausibility of a 
tax advantage in the eyes of a court may be less obvious to a taxpayer, 
even one with substantial business or investment experience. 
To the extent that the taxpayer should have questioned the 
purported tax benefits, the court next should consider the taxpayer’s 
attempts to test its doubts and particularly the taxpayer’s interaction with 
the tax advisor.  For example, it may be sufficient if the taxpayer raises 
its concerns with the tax advisor who assures the taxpayer that the 
purported advantages are available, that the advisor has considered and 
properly addressed all relevant issues, and that the advisor has addressed 
any contrary IRS pronouncement.  Such assurances should not 
themselves be treated per se as unreliable, because as a number of courts 
have noted in this context, legitimate structures exist that provide 
outsized tax benefits,271 and courts are not bound to follow every IRS 
announcement.272   
 
 271. See, e.g., Am. Boat Co. v. United States, 583 F.3d 471, 485 (7th Cir. 2009): 
the government points to the substantial tax benefit that Jump received as a result of the 
short-sale transactions, claiming that such a ‘too good to be true’ transaction should have 
put him on notice that something was awry.  There is no doubt that the benefit Jump 
received was large, and this is the argument that gets the government the nearest to 
undermining Jump’s assertion that he had reasonable cause.  But, in general, ‘it is 
axiomatic that taxpayers lawfully may arrange their affairs to keep taxes as low as 
possible’ 
Southgate Master Fund, LLC v. United States, 651 F. Supp. 2d 596, 667 (N.D. Tex. 2009): 
the Government argues the tax results of Southgate were simply ‘too good to be true’ 
and that Plaintiff displayed head-in-the-sand negligence.  Plaintiff responds that through 
careful reading of the Internal Revenue Code and reliance upon tax and legal 
professionals, it determined that the interaction of Code sections could plausibly create 
tax losses that exceeded cash losses.  As Professor Weisbach verified, citing Crane v. 
Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), and Comm’r v. Tufts, 460 U.S. 300 (1983), a scenario in 
which the tax losses exceed the cash contributions to the transaction does not necessarily 
render a transaction illegitimate.  Weisbach noted that many transactions–as when a 
company acquires a bank with distressed loans, like the Wells Fargo acquisition of 
Wachovia in 2008–produce tax losses in excess of economic losses 
Allison v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 568, 596 (“there is no per se rule that tax benefits of a certain 
size are presumed impossible.”).  Cf. Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 358 
(2008) (upholding objection to offer of an expert report that, among other things, “recounts the 
history of aggressive tax planning as a legitimate approach to minimizing taxes and . . . surveys 
cases in which courts have upheld taxpayers’ aggressive tax planning strategies . . . examin[ing] 
cases in which taxpayers prevailed even where a situation was ‘too good to be true,’ and where the 
IRS prevailed even where a situation was ‘too bad to be true.’”). 
 272. See Ryan Lirette, Giving Chevron Deference to Revenue Rulings and Procedures, 129 
TAX NOTES 1357 (2010); Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance:  The No Man’s Land of Tax Code 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239 (2009); Ryan C. Morris, Comment, Substantially 
Deferring to Revenue Rulings After Mead, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 999 (2005); American Bar Ass’n 
Section of Taxation, Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717 (2004); 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Taxpayers normally should not be permitted to rely on the opinions 
of tax advisors who are tax shelter promoters, brokers of tax shelters, or 
have referral arrangements with promoters.  To allow reliance on 
opinions that are rendered by persons who are clearly motivated to 
overstate the merits of a tax structure would undermine the purpose of 
the penalty regimes and ultimately the tax system as a whole.  However, 
courts should not deny a taxpayer the ability to rely on an opinion 
merely because the tax advisor delivers the opinion in circumstances that 
create apparent temptations, for example because the tax advisor has 
developed or implemented a tax reduction strategy that ultimately proves 
ineffective.  Such an approach is intellectually flawed because it 
confuses the temptation to distort with the distortion itself.  Also, such 
an approach risks imposing unwarranted penalties on taxpayers who turn 
to tax advisors to guide them in legitimately reducing their taxes.  
Rather, in determining whether the taxpayer acted reasonably in relying 
on a tax opinion, courts should consider the nature of the apparent 
temptations faced by the tax advisor and the advisor’s apparent 
resistance to those temptations, as they affect the taxpayer’s efforts to 
assess its proper tax liability. 
 
John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain:  Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and 
Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 58 (2003); Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets 
Tax Hyperopia:  The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 637 (1996); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in 
the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35 (1995); Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue 
Rulings:  Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1995); Linda Galler, Emerging 
Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841 (1992).  
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